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The lhesis examines lhe Croatian secession from Yugoslavia in 1991 and the Slovak.
secession from Czechoslovakia in /993. There are two objectives of this examination.
First. the thesis seeks to determine why the respective secessions occurred. Second. the
lhesis attempts to discern why the Croatian secession was violent and why the Slovak
secession was peaceful. In reaching lhe answers to the objectives. the thesis utilizes an
explanatory approach ra/her than a normative one. John Wood's theoretical framework
on secessions is utilized 10 organiu the analysis presented in this study. It is argued toot
the baris for (he secessions of CrooIia and Slovakia rests with the colinpse ofpolitical
institutions. The collapse of necessary polin·cal institutions in Yugoslavia in the fonner
case and in Czechoslovakia in the inner case precipitaIed the secessions of CrooIia and
Slovakia. The Croatian secession was in inrge pan the result of the dissolution of the
Yugosinv Communist Pany. the re-pluralizaIion ofpolitics. and the re-binh ofethnically
defined political entities bound by ethnically defined political agelUlns and ideals. The
Slovakian secession can hardly be called a secession. /t shauld be characterized as a
dissolution ofa bi-narional stale after a briefrevisitarion with democracy. The Slovakian
secession was a product of a flawed federal constitution borrowed from communist
ancestors. a disinterested populace and political elile. and the existence of a uro-sum
game perception thal was common in this bi-polar state. On the issue of violence. the
lhesis examines Roben Young's work on peaceful secessions. In this regard. the most
salient issue in the Croatian case regarding the explosion of violence is the exisunce of
a significant narional minority within existing CroaJian territory coupled with an equally
threauning external presence of a nationalizing Serbia. The absence of a complex web
ofimer-ethnic relaIionships in the fonner Czechoslovakia created a suitable atmosphere
for a peaceful dissolution.
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1.0 A PREVIEW OF THE CROATIAN AND SLOVAKIAN SECESSIONS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
A paradox exists in the world with regard to simultaneous trends towards the political
integration of states and the disintegration of individual states. Two seemingly
incompatible forces have been unleashed in the international community: global
interdependence and the rise of independence-seeking subnational units propelled by
nationalism.' While the forces promoting the integration of states. particularly in
Western Europe are reasonably well understood, the meaning of and reasons for the
recent secession of subnational units have not received the same kind of attention.
Tbe break-up of states in Eastern Europe has featured two paths for gaining
independence. WhiJe many wiU assume that secession necessarily leads to violence (as
was the case in the former Yugoslavia) Czechoslovakia's "velvet divorce" is an example
of a peaceful separation. This thesis focuses on the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia
in 1991 and the secession of Slovakia from Czechoslovakia in 1993 with the objectives
of increasing our knowledge of secessions and shedding light on how violence can be
avoided in the future.
I 1"0 O.~, °Mulbc:onuatmaI ad Bicloamlillll. Politis ad 1llrir b11enl.D:l1la1~ .. ill PstfwM:d So!trtipbg pIlplCnlMipy!
Rel!pJon _ T!'J!!!:So''!!I1! Coegcw ol SgbryDoyl Cio¥mmcaq odl. 1"0 O. o.:a..:u. o.id l.aboc::Ile, _ o.nb s.e_ (New YOit Ciftalwoocl
Pra.l,I9U),4-S.
In the process, the thesis seeks to examine various explanations for lhe
aforementioned secessions. In addilion, reasons are soughl to explain the divergence in
methods used by Croatian and Slovak political elites in their respective independence
campaigns. Thus the thesis utilizes an explanatory approach as opposed to a normative
one.
As such, three arguments are defended in the thesis_ First, the secession of
Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991 and Slovakia from Czechoslovakia in 1993 are
indicative of similar interests in the two republics to reject the respective federal
arrangements. These interests reflected a dissatisfaction with previous communist
regimes, a desire by republican political elites to seize the opportunity to pursue
parochial polilical interests, and an unequivocal rejection of federal institutions in both
countries_2 The political elites we are referring to are those individuals who occupied
positions of influence in the communist intelligentsia. In each state there was a strong
tendency for the elites to identify with the republic to which they were ethnically
attached. The thesis utilizes an analytical framework that focuses on the structural
aspects of federalism with emphasis on constitutional arrangements, federal institutional
collapse, and federal and republican-level processes involving power-seeking,
entrepreneurial political elites.
2 a)' ...... illstJNIDlI __ Iq;a1iWc:=d6c:IutiIi&d.lkpolD::al~orl"*.'hoeK~l'omllk_.ror
1O"U'l"'l'IIl~il_. see,noo-O.HIXII.,-lqituIlK)', Dc:eocrK)'.-.:IFederll_.-.",*"'.mJ!!!ll!!!;R*p(!l!'iStw_· Hc:nn-.
&.uv. lIIId Will... M. 0tlr0dIr:r f!grpos>: u.,vrnq of lorog!l P!w lun ]2
Second, the secessions of both Croatia and Slovakia were realized because of the
institutional collapse of communism and long-term trends which promoted national senses
of grievance and difference within the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak states. Nationalism
was subjected to constraints which varied in severity through time during the history of
communist power in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia but even during periods of severe
repression it remained alive. Once the dismantling of communist controls began the open
manifestation of nationalism rapidly made itself felt in East European politics and
contributed to the break-up of multinational states.
Finally, the thesis focuses on why the Croatian secession was so violent in
comparison to the Slovak "velvet" secession. It is the contention of the thesis that the
violence of the Croatian secession was partly due to the intention of the Serbian elite
under the leadership of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to strengthen Serbia's
position, either in a united Yugoslavia or in a "Greater Serbia", if preservation of the
Yugoslav state proved impossible. Particularly important is the existence of a large
Serbian minority in the eastern region of the "Krajina" in Croatia. Coupled with the
problem of the Serb minority was the issue of state borders. Once Croatia's
determination to secede became apparent, the issue of its territorial delimitation became
an acute problem. Czechoslovakia's break-up did not involve the conflict-engendering
issues of borders and minorities.
The next section provides an overview of events leading up to the secessions of
Croatia and Slovakia from their respective federal entities. This overview is provided
in order that the reader might bener understand the arguments that are provided in the
remainder of the thesis. The second chapter examines and explains the Croatian and
Slovakian secessions. The third chapter discusses the divergence in secessionist methods
utilized in Croatia and Slovakia.
1.2 THE WOOD PARADIGM
The thesis utilizes an analytical framework based on John R. Wood's article "Secession:
A Comparative Analytical Framework.' While there are no theories of secession, Wood
has identified a set of processual conditions that increase the likelihood of secession.'
The thesis utilizes these conditions as a framework to explain the secessions of Croatia
and Slovakia.
As Wood correctly points out in the article, most scholars in Political Science
during the 1970. and early 1980. focused on the trend of interdependence in the
international community. However, there has been an explosion of political trends in the
opposite direction. Not only is European integration proving to be difficult, secessions
involving .several ethnic minorities and federal states have come to the forefront of world
politics in the recent past.
Wood begins with the preconditions of secession which are those events that may
cause a feeling of alienation among secessionists. These feelings might include anger at
) JoU J.. Wood. 0S«:eu..: A~ AaalyOc;II "'-..-art, ° c....n. k!InyI of PotiticJI Sepq \4 (1911): 101-1)4.
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domination by a particular region or ethnic group within a segment of the economy or
political landscape. Second, the rise of secessionist movements must be examined.
Third, the response of central governments is an important consideration when
examining the phenomenon of secession. In this regard, the success or absence of
success by federal governments in preventing the secession is imponant. Fourth,
attention is focused on the direct precipitants of secession, particularly those events that
occur just prior to the decision to secede. Are these events confrontational? Are they
violent in nature? These events may determine whether the participants have gone past
a point of no return. Fifth, the issue of the use of violence as a resolution to the
secessionist conflict is crucial to any analysis because it points to the use of violence by
either the existing government or the secessionist entity. This condition also raises the
question of the influence of international actors on the secessionist process.
1.3 NARRATIVES ON THE VELVET DIVORCE AND THE VIOLENT SECESSION
The articulation and development of nationalistic politics in both Croatia and Slovakia
contributed to the eventual demise of their host states.· The re-emergence of nationalism
as a political force was facilitated by the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern
Europe. Once the communist regimes were dismantled, the re·pluralization of politics
4 Sabrina Ramd, NMionalgm and ,,*rJ!ifm in YUl95lJvia (BJoominrtoD; 1n<1ian Univenic)' Pftas, 1992), 19. Ramet providc$ a $uccind:
anll)'$b on !be role or Slobodan Milolevif; in the 0IIlbruk of violel:ll c:oonict. Also see SIIaron Wolehik, '1bc: PoIi!iQ or Edlnicily in PoIt.{;ommunbt
C~lovWa.· East Esuyoan Polltia IDd Sog;pt.t I (Winler 19904): IS]-III.
began to develop which included the re-emergence of ethnically based political parties
and inter-ethnic antagonisms. At this juncture, the thesis discusses the events leading up
to the secessions. This task is necessary to provide a basic understanding of the political
climate prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
1.3.1 The Disintegration of Yugoslavia
The following discussion is broken down into two pans. The ftrSt segment discusses,
very briefly, the background to Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav idea, with some discussion
of the Yugoslav republics, ethnic groups, and political leadership. The second segment
examines the most important events and issues leading up to the 1991 dissolution of
Yugoslavia. It should be noted, however, that there is some overlap between the two
segments.
1.3.1.1 A Background to the Second Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Idea
The Yugoslavia that is discussed in the thesis refers to the second attempt at
uniting the south slav peoples from 1945 to 1991. The flTSl Yugoslavia existed as a
kingdom from 1918 to 1939.' During World War n, much of Yugoslavia was occupied
S Both the lint IIld w;:ond YIllOSlI.v ItIleI eontailloed wiout ialU1lal le~iool based Oft compctinl viaions of o:letired O!.IlClOmeli willi reprd to
the !kvelopmentO(l!le YlllO'lavl~ IlldrdlliollS betwllen .. oonstinocnll,lllibllldpcop~. See DeMit Rllli!low, "TheAvoidablee-trOpIle,' ill
Pohpcs Economg and Cu!tuB ods. SIbnllIl Petra bIDet IIlld ljubiu. 5. M.raovdl (8ou..Ider; Wettvie.. Plu., 1995), 17.
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by German or Italian troopS.6 From 1945 until the end of Yugoslavia in the summer of
1991, Yugoslavia was comprised of six republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two autonomous republics located within
Serbian territory (Vojvodina and Kosovo). For an illustration of the former Yugoslavia,
see Figure I on page 8 of the thesis.
Ethnically, the Yugoslav republics were intermixed in a complex web of
communities. In fact, Bosnia-Hercegovina was and still is seen as a smaller version of
Yugoslavia as it is comprised of Slavic Muslims, Croats, and Serbs.1 Serbia was and
continues to be an ethnic mix as it is comprised of Serbs, Albanian Muslims,
Hungarians, and Croats' Croatia, like the aforementioned republics, was ethnically
diverse and its population notably included approximately 11.6% Serbian concentration,
most of whom were located in the eastern regions of the republic.9
The state was formed by communist partisans who fought from 1941 to 1945 to
defeat the Serbian royalist regime defenders and to rid the area of German and Italian
6 F.-..o Trq... NEoyI.m III Co!!t!;mpamy Ewooe~'" Yon: CohunbilI UIlYen"- Preis. 1911). 1()4.106. Dooannl die ...... Serttoa.
wtlcll_mo.....8oPia-Hef'OelO't... _lIludlottheC...... _(~_llCCIlpledby~_llalmIr-.CnJaau>Acd ••
puppd'l*ortheNUJf __ ~bythefalallrel_Or...,,1Ch¥ebdl wlIid1i1oftc:a refcnv;l ... dlcUMM/l.&. U'IIaIJu.$Uleletf'l)nSDl
rocvsedpnllClpI1I)'onSerbsaadJe".and_50utrelllCthM;1taWmcdtheGcnniUlmiliWy~Hilkr1lld~iftCI'OlbL SeeJ.
Rot!lId!iId. Return III DiVe!)ity. A Poliriq! Histpry pr Eat! Ce:nlt!! Eurs Sing; Wprid W" II (Odonl: Ql.fonI Unlvcnlty Pn:$$, 1993). 'I.
1Ibld.• I20.
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troops. Josip Broz Tito, the well known former President of Yugoslavia. led the panisan
military organization. Tito ruled until 1980'0 From 1980 to 1991, Yugoslavia began
to disintegrate slowly. II However, Tito's rule did not exhibit complete stability. The
introduction of the 1974 constitution was at leas! partially the result of unrest in Croatia
where Croatian Communists sought to increase the republic's autonomy in areas related
to banking and resource allocation.
1.3.1.2 Important Events and Issues Leading Up to the 1991 Dissolution
The year 1991 witnessed the ravages of violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia
beginning with the declarations of independence in Slovenia and later in Croatia.
Slovenia, with a population comprised primarily of ethnic Slovenes and relatively few
ethnic minorities, separated from Yugoslavia after a brief 14 day war with the Yugoslav
National Army.12 The Republic of Croatia, in contrast, would not experience the same
fortune as it would become embroiled in a bitter, longer-lasting conflict with both the
10 Tiro'. Yueo-l..... 1IlnClaI a.sllknblc meaoo. &va>W~ scBolan. last II few JtudJa c.qmm-a die ~1aI1eaDu IDCI
hll policiea we. AIeab Djilll, Dc Corygud COWIl:ry - Y1!I9IIf" UlIly and CommuP!M Ilnohlli!!!! 1919:191] (1..oIodoo: Harvin! University Press. 1991);
IldLard Wut. TiWapd t!le RK I!!d Fall of Yup""11(Loadoa: Sindair·$Ic_, 1994); Illd DullcaD WikoG, ~(CllDbnd~:
C....bnd&;e UnIversity Press, 1979).
II Ibid.,J"".
12 Suun Wood'to'lJd. BtIbn IrpsdY' Chaot and Dissolytioa Mer t!le Cold War 30.
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Yugoslav National Army and minority Serbs in the region of the Krajina° This bloody
conflict and a subsequent one in Bosnia-Hercegovina, with their terrible episodes of
"ethnic cleansing". would spark much spurious commentary concerning ancient enmities
in the Balkans. This seemingly irrational phenomenon can be understood. First, we
have to consider its immediate background and we have to go outside Croatia to Serbia
and consider the rise of Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic.
Milosev1c's rise to power occurred during a period when Yugoslavia was
burdened by crisis. Economic and social problems were becoming severe and ethnic
antagonisms were rising. Within Serbia, long-developing tensions in Kosovo were
coming to a head. Relations between Kosovo's Albartian majority and Serb minority
were deteriorating. It was in this context, in 1987. that Serbian Communist leader
Slobodan Milosevic organized a "putsch" in the Serbian League of Communists
consolidating support by raising the Kosovo question and purging both the Albartian-
Muslim bureaucracy in the autonomous province. as well as those Serbian politicians who
opposed him. 14 The importance of his rise to power in Serbia is evident when one
considers that his policy nn Knsovn and the Albanian Muslim adntinistrative leadership
in the province struck a chord with nationalistic Serbs in Serbia prnper, making
II Ian 1Cunlt. ·c....... Pobla: 11Ie Ne_ A~illlI,'Jk PoIIbC:1! Ouanc:riy 61 (1996): 36-31. TIle Yu&061n N--.J, Army,.
JNA_pnmarily.Serb_...-lroroe __ offic:enwereofSertrilllorclll. TIleKnjilLaSerllt;IIIo~.puIIIll1Dryfon:&oII1Ix:blllChoded
fonnerpobc:coffioer1.
14 Slbnna Ramel, N!l!9nl1islJl IIld Feskl'l!ilm in Yl!I9IllVM (BJoomin(lon: Ind..... Uniyenity Prcu, 1994), 68. For Serbl the KOIOYO
qllUtioIl iI importlllt tot two reasonl. Fittt, the JIarltinl of provineil! '*'" to KOIOYo aad VojvodilLa Wldrin Serbiol by Tito redllced the nllmber of \IOtCt
lleldby Serbpoliticilnl in the Fedetl! Astembly. 1IIUIn1 itditflCllh for the Serbl 10 pili ft:den! klillltion. $eoood, KOIOvo ... hillOric:lmponanceror
Serbl becllIK il: is the loc::IIion oflMdievl1 Serbia Illd the bIIlIe-&round for the Serb__ to theOtloman EllIpart.
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Milosevic a folk hero." Also, Milosevic appealed to those Serbs who felt that they
were unjustly criticized for the woes of the Yugoslav federation and those who were
unhappy with the demands for increased decentralization as aniculated by the Croats and
Slovenes. 16
Milosevic played the nationalist card for all that it was worth. Specifically, the
focus on nationalism by the Serbian leader was based on the widespread support for the
re-establishment of Serbian hegemony in an increasingly decentralized Yugoslavia. This
contributed to the demise of Yugoslavia's Communist Party which went into a state of
terminal decline following its 14th Congress in 1990 which ended in deadlock." The
League of Communists of Yugoslavia gave up its monopoly on power and competitive
elections were organized in the republics. ationalist centre-right parties won the
elections in Croatia and Slovenia. II The debate over Yugoslavia's political future
became more intense as a consequence. The Serbian Communist leadership, now
restyled as Socialists, sought a more centralized political union while Franjo Tudjman of
Croatia and Milan Kucan of Slovenia sought a more decentralized political and economic
union. In short, the political agenda of Slobodan Milosevic equated a stronger Serbia
U 1b1d.6I~.
16 V5lU.l'opoYstrj. 'Yvp,bVla: PoIibeI.~,N....• • Fedm!it•. ns M!!bdtDK: Cha!kftn ed. Grlllt..- 5.... (LoedooI:
LoaI_,I~).l96.
11 LaunS.... '$IabodaDMiIoIcYlC's Poliocs 01 War and I'ha:.' Wor!dPolip JsNny! 13(1996); 63-66.
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with a stronger Yugoslavia - a contention which was diametrically OIlPO~u III Croatia and
Slovenia. 19
Despite the worsening situation in Yugoslavia, attempts were made to
accommodate all regional interests. Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic, a Croat by
birth, managed to stabilize the economy in 1990 thus Obtaining guarantees for further
foreign investment and aid.20 The development, nevertheless, did nothing to stifle
attempts in Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia to pursue parochial interests. By 1990,
Slovenia's President Milan Kucan was opting for an asymmetrical federal arrangement
while Franjo Tudjman of Croatia wanted to pursue a confederal model." President
Milosevic of Serbia was adamantly against these recommendations arguing that
Yugoslavia was better off with greater central control.
Meanwhile, the federal presidency was in utter chaos, unable to achieve any
semblance of a consensus on future arrangements" Coupled with these problems, the
increase in grass roots political groups in Croatia and especially in Slovenia led to calls
20 RobutF. Miller, -ncJ"ilfallsol~I(:Rcror-. Y"IO'I!av.. • A",stral_ .IoytntIoflt!!m!ar>ona! N!M-4'(Novembc:r 1991): 217.
220.
21 A.lymllllCCric:alfi::Ocnl.lIIc..~Oefined.dlel\A.lalCeoroneor_s~lIIIlbwhidl~ •• ~bylllcconstJWbOtl
or policnl r.ct, ~,., DOt Ivailabk lO otMr subnmonal unQ. CQofederal.... rde,., 10 all 8fTWllelllelll~ '1Ibn.Ibooal una and the rederal
lovemment where pollDc:al po~r h. moved .....y ITom the oen~ and lOward the 'lIbnational ""its. CQorederalism II e..entiaUy .. UU'e11le
deoentnli.r.lllion of. mlllti-""it.we. Por I'wt/ler euminMion of these tenm tee Chrlltopbcr HUlha, 'Cantona/ism; Federalism Ind Confedel'al:)" in tile
Ooldco EpodI or Swue~,' ill Cgmpancivs Federal"", II!!! F:esIetp)ft • CgmpWnl T!Jdilloof IIlI! f'vtws Dirsstiont eels. Michlel BW1eu IIId Alain
G. o.c- (Toronto: Uo,vcnMy oI'Torooto!'Tal, 1993), u.s; and Dlnd Millie, 'WhiIber Caud_ FeduaI.iIm1 AllefQtLve CoIutiWtional F_: in
Cgmparaivc FakrJIlfl! IIId Fak..... celli.' Tt!dot!'i!!!s pi FUM !?u'scbor!! ech. Midlael BulJa.I and Al.wl G. c;.p. (TOl'OlllO; UtI,vetslty or
TOI'\)I$) Prus, 1993),203.
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for independence and secession from the federation, an indication that the federal
government and the Serbian leadership were moving too slowly.2J
Initially. referenda were held in Croatia and Slovenia, indicating a peaceful yet
provocative approach to assess the desires of their respective constituencies. However.
the use of peaceful mechanisms was only temporary. Violence soon erupted in the
Balkans when Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and the Croatian Democratic Union
(HDZ) sought to act upon the May 1991 referendum calling for independence," With
the Yugoslav Army still in Croatia, the Croatian Legislative Assembly declared
independence on June 25, 1991.
Considering these developments, the Krajina Serbs resorted to armed force to
resist Croatian control over the region, culminating in armed conflict with Croatian
troops," The JNA, initially acting in the guise of a buffer peacekeeping force, was
seen as an occupying force by Croatians and its troops were attacked by Croatian
paramilitary forces" Despite international recognition of Croatia in January 1992,
fighting continued near the port of Dubrovnik, the region of Siavonia, and in the
24 Kurns, 'CroIbID~: Tbe New AutborUriIaillll,' 21.
2j Marko MiliYOjevie, 'The Armed F<m:ao(Y\lIOIlavia; Slidin.mIoWr:r,"in BeyondY\l(9!!ni! PolE Econ9miq I!IdCultw§iD.
ShfllCred Communq edI. Sabrint f'tO"II Ramct and Lj~ S. Adamoviell (BoWdu: Weatvie... ~, 1995), 69. From I Serbian penpedJve, their
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Krajina." When fighting did subside later in 1992, the Croatian government had lost
control of one-third of its territory. 28 The eruption of a terrible civil war in Bosnia
during 1992 would pull international attention away from Croatia until the summer of
1995 when a new major Croatian offensive culminated in the recapture of the Krajina
region and a mass expulsion of Serbs. While Croatia has normalized relations with
Yugoslavia in the summer of 1996, the continuation of peace is by no means guaranteed.
1.3.2 The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia
The discussion of Czechoslovakia which follows is divided into a segment on the
background of the state and a segment on the most salient events and issues up to the
1993 secession of Slovakia.
1.3.2. 1 A Background to Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia was located in east central Europe and it consisted of two
republics, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. The languages of the two
republics are very similar. The Czech Republic consisted of Bohemia and Moravia.
21 toc.• cit.
28 David S. Mason. Revolution and Transiuon in Ea5t=Cer!tr!l Europe (Bollider: WUtvCw Press, 19%).27,
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Ethnic composition continues to be primarily Czech in origin.29 Other ethnic groups
include Germans, Moravians, and SiJesians. JO The Slovak Republic is primarily Slovak
in ethnic origin with a large Hungarian minority.3l Other ethnic groups include Poles,
Ruthenians, and Russians." Politically, Czechoslovakia has gone from being a unitlry
democratic state. a unitary communist state. a federal communist state, and lastly to a
brief-lived democratized federal state.)) For an illustration of the former
Czechoslovakia, please see Figure 2 00 page 16 of the thesis.
Czechoslovakia has gone through several changes since its first inception as a
united country in 1918. Czechoslovakia initially existed as a unitary stlte in 1918 with
a democratic and plural system of government." From 1918to 1938, the two principal
population groups (Czechs and Slovaks) lived in the areas that are now the Czech
Republic and Slovak Republic, respectively. During this period, the Czechs and Slovaks
lived very differently. The Czechs were one of the most industrialized people in Europe
29 MU. KIICCfa md l..dend: Pavlilr., 'Czoeb md Slovak DemocnPby," iII!M ElIdofCI!FcIIcMlovp 011. Jiri M.... (1..oDdoa: Call'.
Ewvpua Uaivenlty PTas, l~), IS-liS.
JO .....
31 Ibid.. II.
32 Ibid.
33 StaDislav J. K~m. "C1edaoIJovakia: nw. CreaioD,~, md DiAolutioa of 1 NlIlioa-5ta," Rqipaal PplPe and Soam
3(1993):90.
J4 Edila 8o&U, 'Slovakl md DedlI: An U_, eoc_ilteAee,' in Cgdlotlovaki! 191'-11 cd. H. Gordon Snllinl (New YOJt: St.
MlJUOl" PTaI,I99I),6S.
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with a highly developed political party structure." In contrast, the Slovaks were
primarily agrarian, with a significant level of illiteracy and minimal JXllitical
participation .16
In 1938, the landscape of Czechoslovakia would change rapidly. The Nazi
acquisition of the Sudetenland in the western part of the Czech lands soon gave way to
a full occupation of the entire territory. Siovalda was given a quasi independent state in
1938 under the guidance of the Nazis." After World War II, attempts had been made
to once again reunite Czechoslovakia and some discussion of a plural and democratic
system began. However, the communists in Czechoslovakia began to assert their control
during this period. With the assistance of the Soviet military and Soviet communists,
Czechoslovakia was under communist control in the Soviet bloc from 1947 to 1989."
From 1947 to 1968, Czechoslovakia existed as a unitary state. This soon became
problematic as the Slovaks sought to gain further autonomy. Also, a political reform
movement was gaining ground in the Czech lands in what was called the Prague
Spring." Playwrights and intellectuals challenged the authority of the communists.
However, in 1968, Soviet tanks rolled in Prague to quash the reform movement. The
35 KIIOeR and hylit, "e-:b Ind Slovak Oe~y,' 16.
J6 Bout, 'SloyabaPd Czc:dtJ: lui UDCaI, CoeI.l'leDce,· 66-67.
37 1bod•• 16.
J· tbod•• 71•
39 Ibid., 79.
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only reform to survive Czechoslovakia's "normalization" was the introduction of a
constitutioo in 1968 that federalized the counlry and split it into a Slovak and Czech
republic.40
From 1968 to 1989, Czechoslovakia would exist as a communist federation hut
1989 proved to be a year of remarkable change in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's attempt
to reform the Soviet Union and to encourage similar reforms in Eastern Europe
precipitated the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia." Both Slovaks and Czechs
united to bring down the communist monopoly of power:42 However, after the initial
euphoria of a democratic Czechoslovakia, attention turned to the re-emergence of inter-
ethnic antagonisms wrnch was primarily based on the different needs of each republic'"
Constitutional negotiations were sought to alter the framework of the federation but by
the end of 1992, the only agreement the Czech and Slovak republic leaders could acrneve
centred on the need to dissolve the state."
.......
"I Raben A. Y-a, !hE Brgkyp glCgd!otio9ha~: ~ of~~, 199.t), ....5.
"2 M_S¥eC••~·IVd¥d~.·~(NO'IaIIbuI992):J76-371.
..) Roben Heuy Co£ mel Enc::ll o. Frmtbad. one Federal s-. aM IIlc 8fubp of~ ° PubI.· The- JowuaI of Fcdenlillll
25(lm);JO.
..... YOUllI.!ht.BreakupofCJc.sb9t!9nkit "I.
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1.3.2.2 Salient Issues and Events Prior to 1993 in Czechoslovakia
The year t989 witnessed lhe re-emergence of democracy in some Eastern
European countries. Vaclav Havel, the playwright and lifelong advocate of democracy,
who had been subjected to continued harassment and imprisonment at the hands of the
Soviet-established Czechoslovak. Communist regime. embarked on a maiden voyage as
President of a newly-democratized Czechoslovakia." Despite the re-emergence of
democracy in Czechoslovakia, Slovak dissatisfaction with the federation continued to
exist, especially in relation to the progressive economic (Xllicies of the federal
government in Prague," The disparity in economic development in Slovakia, although
at par with the Czech lands in the 19905, had created a Slovakia that was dependent on
large industry ," The Soviet model of econontic development required that Slovakia
industrialize rapidly, thus creating an over-dependence on military-related production."
With reforms the norm in Prague, many industries were placed on the chopping block,
creating serious hardships for the Slovaks.
45 VIdlI" Havd, aanaa CzedI~. __ II. m.ri ia C:rcdIIoIJovak iliAor)'. the~ playwriabl wIlo dIalImpd the kpaDKy
oIlheCoauaIlllJStrqmw. "poIC\VWO~ For k. efforts. V.::\rt Ha'ld ... ~_1Ioee~becamellymboloflbcCza:llodovU
~ undc:f'&roomd -:I ~me-. For furtllu ttiKusioll of Vadn Have! I« TllIlQdly o.ma AsII, T'I!f Up of Advmn' Ely" O! d!£ F. of
tCaalbndcc: 0nIa Boob, 1919); VIdrt Havd. DiFrurb'" !be PI;p' A Cg!!UHPP' Wid! I(e! HY!Z!1RNJdr tincl (t.o.bI:
F.... 1990): ...~ H. Skilma. ed. CmrhoIkMkle 191'-11: Se"P!! Yoo frpta b (O.JON; !oUo:::ailla. 199\).
47 SceMllmSyec:. ·~IoYllkirl·JVelY«Di\'Ol'Ce"~(I992):319. SY«POlfl.lJoutdlalheSIoYakrepublic:_~ry
Tf.l.Lmt OIIklYy ind\IJlr)'. eapec:WJy in lhe military banlware sector. Thil oncnlltlon became problenuPc: bec:IIIJe SIo..ak compana were not ~ry
c:ompeliti~wilhe military lIIduslr)' ... frowned upon by CtcdI politicianJ.
4B lbid.
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To the Slovak people and politicians, the problem with the federation was the
speedy nature of economic reform which eventually was seen as a lack of concern for
the Slovak people." In addition, by 1990, political leaders in Slovakia (including Prime
Minister Meciar) felt that Slovak interests might be better served in an independent
state.'" While support for independence was not that wide spread, many Slovaks were
keen on obtaining autonomy on economic and social policy. Czech Republic leader
Vaclav Klaus saw no reason to prevent the secessionist desires of the Slovak
leadership.SI
Political elites in Czechoslovakia influenced the emergence of discord and the
eventual dissolution of the state. Specifically, Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel,
Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, and Slovak: Prime Minister Vladislav Meciar were
key actors in the entire political crisis prior to the 1993 dissolution. With the re-
pluralization of politics in 1989 after the collapse of the communist system of
government, free elections permitted the inclusion of a significant number of political
leaders." This, in turn, created what can be called a "fluidity of the party system",
49 Coa and Frankland, "The F«leral sure and tlle Breakup of Czeeboslovakia: An ilIslitutional Analy$iI,' 113.
so Ibicl.,S3.
Sl Robert A. YO\IllI. T!K BrgkuporCttd!9llovakia (KinlPtoD: Institute: oflnttraovemmental Relaions. l~), 41. The author points 0\It
that V*,Ltv lUaus and Vaclav Havel tle<:anle conc:emed about tlle impact of UJlc:ertaioty on the Cze<:h economic and politieal landscape. Thus tile)' be,an to
II:mowled&etll.theSlovu Rcpublielll'QUidevenwaily scocdeanddeclared their inletlOOn notlOinteneoe. II can also be l1Iucd thai Klaus may bave
pusbecl Meciar iDtoaoommitmenttosupportsea:uion..
52 SlIatQll L. Wolchik, "'I'bl: Politic$ of Transition and the Break-Up of Czebollovakia," in !he End of Cuchotlovp eo1. Jiri Musil (New
York: Centnl Europcall Plus, 1995).226.
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slow party formation, and a large number of political parties." This fluidity also
involved low levels of party identification in the Czech and Slovak republics." The end
result of these factors was the emergence of a citizenry which was mobilized easily by
various political elites and groupS.55
The so-called "hyphen war" during the spring of 1990 provided a warning that
relations between the Czech and Slovak republics in the Czechoslovak stale would not
be harmonious. Post-communist political leaders did not wish to retain the official title
of "The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic" for their state but could not agree readily upon
a new designation. Slovak leaders wished to introduce a hyphen into the name "Czecho-
Slovakia" to emphasize the distinctiveness of their national identity. Ultimately a new
official title the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic was adopted but considerable
friction was generated in the process.56
In this environment, republican leaders Vaclav Klaus and Vladislav Medar sought
to promote parochial intereslS. Without popular support, each leader adopted intransigent
policies that set the stage for a political impasse. While Slovaks blamed Klaus for the
jJ Ibod.• zn.
.s4 lbid.
56 For a CODQIC re...- 0( 1M lIyp11ca _ see. C.-oI Sblaill: Lcl'f TM Cpdt II!d * ...."Rmub!g. N... Vms S!W (8oaIdcr.
Wcaf'i'CW Pras, 1997), 129-130.
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political impasse and Czechs blamed Meciar for the same, in 1991, most Czechs (79%)
and most Slovaks (69%) favoured the continuation of the state."
Klaus and Meciar continued to engage in the negotiation to complete the
separation of the two republics. Klaus, the leader of the Christian Democratic Union,
articulated a right of centre political agenda, focusing on policies that emphasized rapid
economic reforms.51 In contrast, Meciar, the leader of the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia, argued for a moderate approach to economic reforms because Slovakia was
hurt by the rapid reforms mentioned above." Also, Meciar sought to obtain greater
autonomy for Slovakia, a move that was in complete contradiction to the centralized
approacb of Klaus'o
This disagreement was extremely pronounced in 1991 as several larger parties
disintegrated. 61 This precipitated the continued movement of public opinion in eacb
republic in opposite directions. In Slovakia it was clear that rapid economic reform, in
the form of rapid privatization and capitalist development, was not acceptable."
S7 1lrid•• 2JJ.
SlIbid.,240.
j9Ib.t.. 23I-240.
60 Ibid. Vildlo¥Klaut_aIamaIIllboll:lbcllOCCUilylOlIlIintaiB'«lltralizedreduall)'lCelll.ordcrlO~lbc_ic:refonaI
wbic:llwe:repopu1al'intheCI:edI~ic.
6\ Gordon Wijlltman.·~ Developmenloftbe Party Sptemandlbo8reak·upof~lovWa,· in Party Forrnltjog in Ept-CentrJ!
~ ed. GordoIl wi&hlJ!l.... (Brookfield: Edward EIpr, 1995).~.
62 Ibid.• 61.
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Meanwhile, Meciar and Klaus continued to stine auemp~ to negotiate a renewal of
federalism in Czechoslovakia."
Defenders of a renewed federation hoped repuhlican and federal parliamentary
elections during June, 1992 would result in governments which were prepared to
effectively negotiate a resolution to constitutional squabbles. Instead "the 1992 elections
only finalized the stalemate", without conscious effort to destroy Czechoslovakia, the two
electorates by focusing on republic-level concerns, had nonetheless elected leaders who
could not, and did not, reach agreement on how to continue the state, 006' Soon after the
elections, Vaclav Klaus, the Czech Prime Minister, virtually forced secession onto the
Slovaks declaring that the federation was at an end. The Slovak parliament adopted a
declaration of sovereignty on July 17, 1992 precipitating the resignation of President
Vaclav HaveL" Czech and Slovak political leaders were finally able to agree on
something. They decided on the dissolotion of the Czechoslovak state and the emergence
of two newly independent states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which
took place on January I, 1993.
63 lbid.
64 Carol Sblnik l.cff, The Cgd end Sign!. Republic!, \J()-1)1.
6S John Morritoa, 'The Ilo-llll SqioI:raIoa; NlIionalism ill Czcllotlgnkia,' ill Cppkimpqrm NW""m in fat 9iinPJI Eyrope ed.
Laowsb (New York; St. Maroa', Prul. 1996),13.
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2.0 EXPLA1NING THE CROATIAN AND SLOVAKIAN SECESSIONS
The developments reviewed in the preceding narratives now will be viewed in a more
analytical perspective. John R. Wood, a UBC political scientist, has proposed an
analytical framework which is very useful for such a purpose. He directs attention to the
preconditions of secession, the rise of secessionist movements, the response of central
governments, the direct precipitants of secession and the role of armed forces in the face
of a secessionist crisis. 66
John Wood's work on secession is essentially a critical response to the over-
emphasis in the political science literature of the 19705 on supranational organizations
and communities. Linle had heen wrinen during the 19705 and early 19805 about the
proliferation of secession and emergence of nationalistic movements. Wood apparently
decided that it would be useful to follow the model of integration studies but to do so in
reverse. Consequently. he developed an analytical framework influenced by neo-
functionalist thought''' on regional integration but directed his inquiry towards examples
nf political disintegratinn. Wood's analysis of disintegration is processual, directing
66 JolIn R. Wood, "Secalioa: A Com..,mve Analytical Framework: 107.
67 Neo-twlctloftalimfoc:uloatheiDlC.JNXIlI0fWlamdsqmalllor_widlocbcrSQIeJ. Widitheinlel,..;oaoft!le\llo'Oridor
lloba1wDoDofl...,the5O'tereipl)'oI_i&_.txllll.la~.tbed~w_of~.NOIICdIeIeM,W1lIlt!lellllel;"'-of_
-.lbelDCfUlCofpolIbCalUlSbbd.,..lbelOnaol-... andl*'OCh...... SfleJollaI>ladu,·"'N_~FedenlJI.:~kR.aaDdthe
Adue_.· • Co!oepu of 'Fecknl." I!!d Fu!apla . Coamcdnc TrJdippat !!!d Fl!lUJ [)irpct>qaI odI. MidlaJ 8w'pu IIld .... G. GIl--
CT__: U.,YetlCJofT_,,",,*,I99]),64.
attention to the principal actors and events involved in the on-going emergence and
development of political secessions.
2.1 THE PRECONDITIONS OF THE CROATIAN AND SLOVAKIAN SECESSIONS
The thesis argues that in the case of Yugoslavia, the secession of the Republic of Croatia
was due to the collapse of the federal institutional order, especially the LCY or League
of Yugoslav Communists along with the decline of federal governmental institutions.
Within this context, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the secession of Croatia from
Yugoslavia was the result of a simultaneous institutional collapse coupled with the desire
of Croatian political elites to assert control over existing Croatian territory. The inability
of the federal government and republican governments to reach an alternative model of
governance as a single state contributed to the break-up of Yugoslavia.
More importantly. the violence that was associated with the Croatian secession
can be linked to the actions of those political elites in Croatia and Serbia proper who
aimed to promote their respective parochial interests. 68 In addition, the existence of
significant numbers of minority groups in Croatia led to the perception, real or imagined,
of perpetual danger. That is, the possibility that a particular ethnic group, whether
68 s.c._ L. Bura. ·wtyY~FdlApM.· ~(NoYelllbcr 1993): Jj7~360.
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Croatian or Serb, would be harmed was envisioned by both the public and political
elites.69 However. while one can attribute the violence in the Croatian secession to the
existence of minorities and territorial cleavages, the phenomenon of political culture, or
in the case of the Croatian and Serbian conflict, a culture of intolerance is relevant.70
A culture of intolerance refers to the absence of political and social experiences based
on cohesion and cooperation between ethnic groups or between majority or minority
groups.
In the case of the Slovak secession and the collapse of the Czechoslovak state, the
primary reasons for the end result in 1993 are somewhat different. Wh.i1e systemic
difficulties existed, they were primarily in the realm of an emerging democratic and free-
market system. Also, many of the problems between the Slovak and Czech republics
rested on the perception of Czech dominance at the expense of the Slovak republic's well
being. Previous years of uneven development and socia-political differences created
different expectations during the post cold-war era." This was martifested in the
problematic discourse over economic reforms regarding their short and long term effects.
The political elites in Slovakia and the Czech lands seemed unable or unwilling
to reach a compromise through negotiation despite the fact that only a minority of
69 M. Rady, .SdI"«a:na..... -'dlc~ofYupla..... • A¥stnliMI Jotny!orlntrryipy! MfwJ .. (N_mber 1994): 315.
Radypn)¥*".d~_a.JnvUeal:perotpbOBIlIIIdfun.~ Y"I'Q&Iave.e.
10 AJan Caima. "Fodcnlillm II DOt enoulh: MinorUa Within," III Winkinl Fqknlitm cds. Kaml Knopp, 5ylv.. OItry. R.ac:hw Simeon.
and KIlhrynSWUlIOll (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995).22-25.
71 c.n:.uS, Lctf, "Could T1lis M..n.p Have8eal Savodl The~o.von:e."~(M.a.I996): 129-1).4;aad
Slaislav Kirsdlbaum, "Cze.dloIlovakill: The Cmrioll,~ .ad 0u0luti0lI of. N.--S-." hpoyl Pptilict tpd Pp!icy) (5priq; 199):
n.
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Slovaks wanted to secede from the federation in the last election before 1993. Most
Czechs and Slovaks were concerned with the standard of living and the rise of
unemployment in Slovakia.12 [0 addition, the most salient problem for the continuance
of a common state after the velvet revolution seemed to be the divergent and contrasting
political environments in the Slovak and Czech republics.
2.1.1 The Secession of Croatia and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia
It has been argued by journalists, the television media, and by many scholars that the
creation of Yugoslavia was a terrible ntistake and that the federation was artificial and
incapable of continued existence.1l Adding to this, another common statement on
Yugoslavia is that its inhabitants have been at war for centuries and cannot live with one
another.'4 WhiJe the recent inhumane treatment Croats and Serbs have inflicted upon
one anomer may prevent inter-ethnic cohabitation, the assumption that ancient enmities
have caused the secessions is false. The break-up of Yugoslavia and the violence
experienced in the early 1990s was not inevitable." The inhabitants of the Balkans
have not lived in war for centuries but have lived in relative peace with each other for
7. Al..-Caznls,'Feden!illlIiI_-P: MiIoontaWidJ._.'17. e-uptu.ltoen:le_ofla&lalreorVllllalcc ... dlerok
lICIQIan.rq_pa.y.lbelk~of_-cd1u;~...
7S Woodward. Balk. T,.ecIy n.
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many centuries. 76 Towns and villages in Croatia. Serbia. and what is now known as
Bosnia-Hercegovina have been characteristically inhabited by ethnic groups from Croat,
Serbian, or Slavic-Muslim origin.
Another point of contention is the assumption that only homogenous federations
can survive. Most federations in this world cannot be regarded as homogenous ones, yet
most seem to survive despite their heterogeneity.n These contentions, while based on
misperceptions, are dangerous because they simplify the Yugoslav experience. This
chapter demonstrates that the secession of Croatia and the subsequent collapse of the
Yugoslav federal government were the result of complex institutional problems combined
with the parochial interests or republican leaders and the changing of a once predictable
international community.
However, it can be convincingly argued that federal and confederal systems,
regardless of ethnic heterogeneity, are not stable entities. Depending on the number of
subnational units, ethnic character of those units, and the size of the subnational units,
one can argue that these types of state structures are not stable at alt." Nevertheless,
it is necessary to examine different aspects of each federal state to determine why
instability existed and why secession became a reality.
76 ~_ a__. "The A'<'Oid3tlk e-croptIc." III Be. YI!IO!Ir1a Pblibq Ectegmp ItId CWM eels. SabnDa Ptcn a-.-
l.jllbtla S. Mamovdl (Boo&Idu: WeaMew PIal. I"'). 13.
n Woodwvd.~ IS.
78 Jocudl. Lcmco. Politiea1 Stability in Fpskra! Govun!!!C:!rtl. (New York: Pr.eIU, 1991), "1"'2.
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2. I. 1.1 Historical Foundations
While the thesis places some emphasis on the institutional and economic
foundations of Croatia's secession and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the historical aspect
of the dispute merits some discussion. Here, we examine the historical characteristics
of inter-ethnic differences and animosity that may have at the very least facilitated the
dissolution of the Yugoslav state. Specifically, the relationship between the Croats and
Serbs is of interest because the two ethnic groups pursued nationalistic policies that were
formulated in response to the perceived "Serbian" or "Croatian" threat.
Delving further back to the pre-dissolution period, we can outline several issues
that led to the catastrophic days prior to conflict in 1991. The death of Yugoslav
President Josip Broz Tito led to the eventual implementation of a rotating presidency.
From 1945 to 1980, Tito managed to hold together the complex inter-ethnic federation.
The charismatic leader of Croatian-Slovenian origin overcame inter-ethnic problems
initially by utilizing the Soviet threat of invasion in the 1950. and Yugoslavia's
independent foreign policy as mechanisms to promote unity. Yugoslavia's reputation for
independence was enhanced through the introduction and development of an ostensible
system of worker self-management." Worker self-management was supposed to result
in the control of public enterprises at the local level by their employees.
79 The haJa:qce of inlcmal oootrol ooupkd wilb die: inlU1llUDnal impoNnot of Y"'Io&lavii •• siD&1e $llIle worked 10~ dle CO\IIIlly 1lQ1llld.
'fheendoftheoold ..... 1IIl1llCldiael:)o r&IICldthe~ofY~·.1mplXbnC:e lDdle __ .lICW'II WIle. CwpIedwilb iDtvul_icdcd_
...tpolilicalcol1lpK.lbc:"'bt~eQlIldrorlbenKor"""'mandthc~ • SeeS-WOOlho'wd ..~
a.1!!d D!uoIrtbp! AftEr tts Cold w. (W..a.aa-: The 8rookiDas~. 1995). 1)0.
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Yugoslavia's early development inspired hope among many socialists that Tito and
his supporters might pioneer a path to socialism, However, Yugoslavia began to run into
serious political and economic trouble in the 19605 and 19705. Dissatisfaction with
worker self-management became increasingly apparent and transfer payments to the
poorer republics sparked resentment at the elite and citizen levels, especially in Croatia
and Slovenia, Yugoslavia's most prosperous republics, so The Croatian Crisis during
the early 1970s, a period during which Croatian political elites and communist youth
movements contemplated increased autonomy for Croatia, demonstrated that Croatian
nationalism was not dead but had rested in a dormant state during the first decades of
Tito's rule. Tito's repressive means of dealing with the crisis (the removal of senior
Croatian Communists and the institution of hard-line Communists), while diffusing a
dangerous precedent, merely exacerbated nationalistic feelings and perceptions of Serbian
dominanceII Croatian nationalism as articulated in the early 1970s demonstrated that
the extremism of the 1930s and 1940s at the height of Croatian political independence
was not superseded by Tito's "Yugoslav" ideals and that (regardless of the uniqueness
of Tito's Yugoslavia as compared to other communist states) the desire for greater
autonomy for Croatia was never adequately addressed. 52
10 VeuaPopo¥Ui,'Y~ PotiIim.~.N....• 191.
12 -'-llebler. 'Y-aouma'i Vanety ole-._F!:dl:raIiI. _ Her 0-_.' Com._iII. PDt!;.c.o..uglllSg!fin 16(Ma'dI
1993); 76; .. F...,o TlIllj_. N!tlO!!I!iIm • Con!J!!!J!9I)O' Europe (Nno yert: Collllllbla u.n.erslly Preas. 1981). 109.
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Of primary importance in this discussion is the historical differe::nces between the
Croats and Serbs in their mutual development as nations in the Balkans_ Throughout the
history of the Serbs and Croats, each ethnic group has been subjected.o external rule"
The political division of the Balkans between the Ottomans and Hablbourgs reinforced a
pre-existing religious schism between Serbs and Croats. The selJ'l'lltion between the
Roman and Byzantine churches during the eleventh century split BlZe re¥-ion between
Catholicism and Orthodoxy." Two fundamentally different religi",:s developed, two
linguistic scripts emerged, and two different cultural traditions were boom." To further
divide these peoples, the Ottomans and Habsburgs instituted a policy tOf divide and rule
in their respective domains which further differentiated the Croats aJd Serbs."
Distinctive political and religious histories did not impose atdestiny of violent
connict upon Serbs and Croats but did complicate their attempts <II";ng the twentieth
century to live within ODe state. While the Serbs and Croats have Lived in ethnically
mixed communities and even engaged in inter-marriage. the centuriesof division and the
development of distinct cultural and religious differences created .. level of mutual
.l SDr. ..'O a..:. Thf N...... Ouptio! • YIII9!1ria' Qririp Htwry I'o!ibcI (l.oa.: ConIdI UIIl"cnty' Pm•. 1913). I-U:.-l
fna}o TIIdj_ • Np:mIism • CoeK!!!WJr( Europs (New Yort <:oI...o.a Uai¥enily Ptua. 1981). 121-123. er-.. wa iB IIldqlendalcc dunnc the
twl:1Mo0ClltlU'y ... _ Nledby Hgapry.-ltheHlDlblqdyUltyfufapaiodofcilllt Sc:rtrilI_ ~dIUldlc;Clal:Imaempue
lhar1qthe fouNcndIClCIIMy.-lupencaocd l'ourh\lllllbal~ofTurUhnUe.
S4 Cohcll, BroUn Bonda-J'M Ditinte,nUon o(Yum\a...iaSecond Edilion. {BoWdcr: 'iVeaMw PTcu, 1995).~. CL'O*lI typoeaIIy are
Catholic and Serbl are typically Onllodo•.
15 AIthoqh the IinIIlllOl: taips are diffefClll. dle Serb'- _ Croa lanllACea are almoA indistinp.lthtblc •• 1IIfrom diakd. _
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suspicion and miStruSLI? It is arguable that the two different historical traditions
contributed to the development of mutually incompatible political ambitions, namely a
Greater Serbia and Serbian hegemony and a Greater Croatia.II
It should be pointed out, however, that the objective of Pan-Slav unity was
originally articulated by Croat intellectuals and religious figures in the 19th century."
While there were many differences in the structure of Pan-Slav unity proposals, the main
objective was to protect and maintain Croatian cultural identity in the face of external
threats.
However, it is clear that the level of suspicion did eventually lead to paranoia and
ethnic chauvinism during World War II when both the Croatian fascist Ustasha and the
Serbian extremist Chetniks commined unspeakable horrors against each other in the name
of ethnic purity."
The historical division of the Croats and Serbs undermined repeated attempts to
unite the south slav peoples." The divergent cultural, religious, and linguistic traditions
coupled with mutual suspicion over threatening political agendas and horrendous war-
time atrocities directly challenged the plausibility of integrating the Yugoslav community.
87 Drid.• J2I.
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The Croats and Serbs were segmented politically because of these differences. thus unity
was always an extremely difficult task.
It is evident that while institutional and economic conditions laid the foundation
for the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the historical experiences of the Croats and Serbs made
it difficult to unite the south slav peoples. As such, the impending inter-ethnic suspicion
created an environment where the respective ethnic groups were predisposed to identify
with their nation rather than a south slav political entity.
2.1.1.2 Institutional Foundations
In a most basic sense, one can argue that the origin of the secessions in Croatia
and the other republics hinged on the collapse of governmental authority and the erosion
of order in the republics. In the period just prior to secession, the political authority in
Belgrade was unable to effectively govern the country and moderate the desires of the
republican leaders, especially in Croatia where violence was already on the verge of
being realized.!n However, one must go beyond this obvious condition of governmental
beak-down to look further at the structural issues underlying the paralysis of the federal
and republican governments.
!n See Susan Woodwan1,~, 321; and Laslo Sektti, VMlosllvil;' The Proom of DilinlF'!!don (New Yort: CoI\lInbia
Unlvenity Press, 1991), lI.
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Of primary importance is the constitutional order or lack of order prior 1991 in
Yugoslavia. One of the most contentious issues in the years prior to the dissolution of
the state was the role of the Communist Party (LCY or League of Yugoslav
Communists). The role of the Ley and the federal government was to ensure the
communist monopolization of power.9J This fact prevented the possibility of extending
dialogue on true democratic reform and a confederal arrangement for the country as an
alternative to what Croats believed was a Serbian-dominated federal government. The
Communist Party (hereafter referred to as the LCY) would not and could not allow the
pluralization of politics during the 19805 because such a decision would have undermined
its monopolistic position and would have possibly lead to increased political turmoil."
The grip of the LCY on power and its connection to the politicized Yugoslav Army.
limited the possibility of fruitful negotiations." The LCY power monopoly. although
never centralized federally. contributed to further econootic and political decline. its links
to the army allowed political elites such as Siobodan Milosevic to manipulate the JNA
(Yugoslav National Army) to hamper economic reform, and to interfere with any federal
political reform movements. 96
904 Sabrina RaPlct. NM!D!lI!9m JDd fedenhSlll 61.
9S For an c.unnnarion of tile YUlOlbl" AmIy pluse see M. Milivojuk, N, B, AlIco<:.Ir., and P. Mauriet', eels. YIiIOfI'''ia's Scgirity
pikmmM' Armed Fgrsg NMiona/ OSftnq apd Erop Policy (Oxford: Be"l, 1988): and M. MiJjvojevic:. 'The Armed I'ot'oc$ of YIIIJotbivia: SlidirlIJ
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Also imponant in the discussion of instability in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s is
the issue of political parties and their role in creating stability in federal entities.
According William Riker and Jonathan Lemco, as political integration of "federal"
parties decreases, the likelihood of secession increases.91 [n other words, the absence
of political parties which have influence and support throughout a federal state makes it
difficult to facilitate inter-republican cooperation. This, in turn, may lead to political
stalemates which further weaken the viability of the federal government.
The principal institutional failure which set the stage for Yugoslavia's dissolution
was the political paralysis of the LCY which ceased to function effectively at the
beginning of 1990." During the period following Tito's death in 1980 the LCY
"federalized" to an important extent. The party monopolized power but power was
decentralized to the republican and regional levels." Republican leaderships became
increasingly quarrelsome and were unerly deadlocked by 1990 when in keeping with
changes sweeping through Eastern Europe, the LCY surrendered its power monopoly and
authorized competitive republican-level elections. 100
Also related to the constitutional order of the Yugoslav state is the dual concept
of "nation" that developed in communist era Yugoslavia in reference to the ethnic peoples
'n WillialllH.Ilikcr"~I.aaoo,'11Ic~taet-SCnottllreIlldSut"I.,.FedcnI~,'.ThePvslgp!!!!:t!tpf
A!!'5l1CPl f:ecIml'lll ed.. W~ Ilikcr (NondI: lOll-u, 1917), 10.
91 R.._, 'TIle AOO1lbble <:aaaophe,' 17-11.
99 lbid., II.
100 J. Serou, PPlilica! OrJanizatiog in Socialist Yl!J9SlIvy (Do.lr1lIlll: Duke Univenit)' Preu, 1916), 33-45.
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and peoples inhabiting territories. While the republics had the right to sovereignty. the
nature of this sovereignty was contested. Proponents arguing for a move back to a more
centralized system of government contended that this right was only in the realm of
administrative control at the republican level. 10I In Croatia and Slovenia, however, the
common position was that the aforementioned right extended to the realization of
increased autonomy or secession.
As Franjo Tudjrnan discussed in his work Nationalism in CQntemoorary Europe,
the treannent of the national question by the Yugoslav constitution failed to address the
problem of nationality and self-determination. Tudjman argues that the constitution set
out to permit the republics to acquire additional autonomy without addressing the
problems of minority issues and territorial integrity .102 The contention here is that this
issue remained uncontested and unanswered for decades and that the glossing over of the
issue contributed to future inter-elhnic antagonisms. 1oo
Systematically, the most problematic aspect of the institutional crisis was the
effectiveness of the Federal Assembly. Tbe Yugoslav Federal Assembly consisted of a
pentacameral chamber of republican delegates charged with the formation of economic
policy, but decisions were based on the principle of unanimity. Tbe Federal Assembly
was based on a cooperative governmental model which required the consultation of the
101 1b.... 6I.
102 Tudjma, N1l!ll!!I!9111 ill ConIFm!!OfJO' Ewpps, 109. Tudj_, wIlo lI01II' ill s_I'W~ po\ilicaI ~, eariiu pwn-'.
writlnl career and prodllCCd publllXions wll.idll(lCltiminlOlI"OubIe....m1heCOmmllllill.en.IIIIdloritic:I.
\03 Tudjman. NIIion"ism ill C0n!Cmpooo Europe, 112.
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republics and the autonomous provinces through republican representatives. 104 While
Yugoslavia was formally a federal state, the day-to-day political reality was that its was
truly a confederation, becoming increasingly decentralized with power at the centre
weakening to the point where there was little that the federal government could
accomplish,'05
Most problematic with this institution was the fact that the republican leaders
could veto any decision made by the assembly, thus rendering it ineffective. This fact
was very evident in the latter phases of Yugoslavia's existence as the Federal Assembly
was completely at the mercy of the feuding republics, especially over economic
policy.l06 The economic aspect of the struetural crisis is discussed in the next section
to illustrate the manner in which the economic decline of the state influenced the
perceptions of the republican political elites and their citizenry.
The provisions of Article 244 of the Yugoslav Constitution, as wrinen in 1974,
were largely responsible for the aforementioned institutional crisis, In no uncenain
terms, Article 244 contributed to the increased devolution of power to the republics by
I04Colla1,~,66.
105 A -<:onfedcntion' implies llle sll.ariD&of.ovemmellw inatilvIions between two Dr more unitary Cllbtlel. 111 tile ~ofdlC (ormu
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LeY .00 !he republil;:s were deocnlralized. shain,. Illllllber of fodcral institutions. See O"'rophcr Hu&hes, 'CanlOllaJism: Federation and Confedc...ey
III tile Goldea Epoc/l of Swmrtand,' in Com.-Jve fSllkl'l!itm IDd EedttMjqg - Competinl T!'I!!ilion! and FI!!W] DbJgionJ cds. Micblltl 81U1CU and
A1tIn G. <A&- fToroaco: UIl,vus-rofToroalD Pftu, 1993), 155.
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emphasizing the "unanimity principle" ,'07 While the LCY prevented the articulation
of republican ethnic grievances through its monopoly of power, the 1974 Constitution and
its decentralizing effects laid the groundwork for future inter-ethnic grievances and
legislative paralysis,'OO The combination of these two conditions likely contributed to
the difficulty in acquiring a new federal arrangement prior to 1991 and the effective
management of the economy. 109
To further worsen political relations among the federal republics in Yugoslavia,
the collective presidency, instituted after the death of President Josip Broz Tito in 1980,
proved to be an utter failure in executive federalism. Il consisted of a rotating
presidency whereby each republic had a single representative to the collective institution
and a single president of the federation who rotated his or her position annually, By the
ntid 19805, the collective presidency showed serious signs of fatigue as it was incapable
of adequately sustaining the federation due to the impending political feuds between
republican leaders who were more interested in promoting their parochial interests than
the unity of the Yugoslav state.'''
107 vOjiaDimilrijevic:,·TbcI9'14c.o...an.-IIIdCoastin4ioaalProoe:w.tbeCoUapseofYlllc.........·irIYvw!lnl: Thef:onner!!!d
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The federal government's incapacity can be demonstrated with reference to the
Prime Ministership of Ante Markovic, a Croat, who failed to strike a balance between
the demands of his own republic and the republics of Slovenia and Serbia prior to the
dissolution of lhe state in 1991. Even more disturbing was the influence of the JNA
(Yugoslav Peoples Army) in the dealings of the Federal Assembly and Prime Minister
Markovic. Specifically. the JNA, acting on behalf of Milosevic and his military and
political objectives, acted in contradiction to Markovic's plans to reform federal
institutions by promoting a pro-communist hard line movement led by the head of the
JNA. "' Marko Milivojevic in "The Armed Forces of Yugoslavia: Sliding Into War"
also reiterates the aforementioned contention. Milivojevic claims that Markovic's
government and the Federal Assembly were doomed because the JNA directly interfered
with both Markovic's federal agenda as well as the reform movement in Serbia
proper. "' The political nature of the JNA and its attachment first to the Ley and later
to the Milosevic government in Belgrade precluded any possibility of comprontise in
negotiations between republics. The existence of democratically oriented panies and
political movements among the major players in the Yugoslav conflict may have created
an atmosphere that was more conducive to political negotiation and compromise. The
III Marko MilivOJCVlC, "The AfTIICd Foroes ofY"'l..lav~: Slidinl;LaIO w.,,"n.
112 Ibid.
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fact that the federal government and its legislative arm were immobilized by the parochial
interests of the republics rendered any constitutional or legal order improbable. III
2.1.1.3 Economic Foundations
The deterioration of the Yugoslav economy and the chaos that was associated with
it must be examined with reference to the impact that it had on political and social
institutions and relations. The impact of decades of economic decline was significant and
was influenced largely by the inability of federal and republican institutions to develop
policies that were sensitive to external market challenges and opponunities. Il " While
the effects of economic decline created additional problems for the Yugoslav federal
government, the blame rests primarily with inadequate political institutions at the federal
level and the continuing rivalry among republics. It is arguable that this inter-republican
rivalry contributed to the failure of the political and economic institutions.
The economic crises which have slowly emerged from the 19605 onward
presented substantial difficulties for the federal union. From 1%5 to the dissolution of
the federal union, Yugoslavia was unable to substantially improve its economy while
much of non-socialist Europe had gone through two technological revolutions. The
numerous crises included inflation that exceeded 2000 percent, an extremely high level
III Ibid., 69
II. Cohen,~,51. CoklIpro.... u~ofthedfccttofCCOllODlil:tl'It._tbc.,lIIriIitJofdleYup1a'l_.
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216-211.
of foreign debt, and soaring unemployment.'" Particularly problematic was the 1974
constitution which required the consensus of all 6 republics and 2 autonomous provinces,
each with significantly different economic and political motivations. The result was a
complete mismanagement of economic resources and calls from wealthier republics such
as Croatia and Slovenia for more autonomy in certain areas of the economy.116
In particular, the Slovenian government of Milan Kucan believed that his republic
had been contributing a high price to remain in the union. Specifically, the Slovenian
republic contributed 25% to the federal budget, 19% to the Federal Fund for
Underdeveloped Regions, 18% to the Gross National Product, and 23% of total exports
while only comprising 8% of the total Yugoslav population.'" Thus, the prevailing
view of Slovene and Croat leaders (Kucan and Tudjman respectively) was that the federal
government, seemingly staffed by incompetent Serbian bureaucrats, was incapable of
investing the resources that originated from the richest Yugoslav republics. The common
perception among the aforementioned republics was that the federal government was
utilizing these funds and resources to deal with the Serbian obsession with Kosovo and
its historical importance to the Serbian nation. 118
liS Robert F. MiUu, "The Pitfalls of Eoonomic Reform in YlI&oslavia," A!!5tn1i1n Journal pf In"rnational Affain 4S (November 1991);
116 Rarnd, Natipnali1m and Federalism, 68.
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An often overlooked aspect of Yugoslavia's economic decline is the existence of
external pressure on the country to reform its economy. This pressure, primarily coming
from international financial organizations such as the fnternational Monetary Fund (IMF),
precluded the Yugoslav federal government from pursuing economic policies that may
have alleviated some of lhe economic pain in lhe republics, lhus perhaps removing
ammunition from republican leaders' nationalistic platforms. 119
In the period after the formation of Yugoslavia and until the 19705, Yugoslavia
had significant difficulty in obtaining financial aid from both western and Soviet-bloc
nations.'" Due to its status as a member of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM),
Yugoslavia was overlooked by lhe United States on several occasions for aid.12I As
time wore on and lhe Yugoslav government was in need of funding, negotiations wilh
the IMF brought some temporary relief. However, the beginning of the 19805 brought
a change in the economic well being of all Yugoslav republics, especially in the Republic
of Croatia. In
This period marked the beginning of an austerity program aimed to slash the
immense foreign debt, decrease inflation, and improve Yugoslavia's economic image
abroad. What was most problematic during this period was the fact that the standard of
119Woodward.~17.
120 v.. HellV_,'U~ tile BaIbD. BIuk-vp; In.
121 tbtcL
122 Miller. "Tbe hfalb or Ec:oeomx: bform iI. Yqoslavla,' 217-211.
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living declined significantly and the social programs that guaranteed equality among
citizens were under direct attack due to the ensuing economic decline. l23 This decline
created an atmosphere of chaos and a sense of economic and political turbulence as
republican leaders and the federal government could not find the means to halt the
changing economic order of the country. Accompanied with this sense of chaos was the
realization among republican political leaders that the benefits of remaining in the union
were slowly diminishing. 124
Yugoslavia's economic vulnerability was highlighted further when, in 1987,
federal Prime Minister Branko Mikulic reopened negotiations with the 1MF.'" Earlier,
Mikulic attempted to develop a set of economic policies designed to stabilize the price
of goods and maintain social programs. However, the continuation of IMF support
necessitated a return to an orthodox program. The result of the IMFs demands and the
implementation of the program included the significant rise of consumer prices. major
cuts in spending, and a frequently devalued currency. Republican feuding continued to
act as a catalyst to further economic collapse. Speculation among the wealthier republics
such as Croatia and Slovenia blamed the economic decline on "Serbian" mismanagement
at the federal level. 126
12J Ramee, Fwmhsm !!!d NJrionalslII n.
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In summation, it is clear that the desires of the international financial community
and the needs of the Yugoslav federation were in connict. The IMF wanted a stronger
central federal administration of economic policy which rested on an increase in civil
order and a more centralized economy. The reality of the Yugoslavia of the late 19805
was a society that was further decentralizing to the point of a confederation and increased
regional autonomy. The request hy the IMF for increased centralization was political
suicide for the Yugoslav stale. l27 The federal government could nOl move in the
opposite direction to the republics, and for a time, the Markovic government of the late
19805 attempted to follow the lead of Slovenia and Croatia in the process of
democratization and free-market reforms. 12B
However, the IMF demands for increased central control initially worsened the
economic condition of the republics which, in turn, created a sense of federal
insensitivity and incompetence, making the prospect of separation much more appealing.
As Susan Woodward states in the Balkan Tragedy· Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold
,War, such conflicts are often resolved in legislatures in western democracies.
Yugoslavia's continued existence was at the most crucial point - a point of flux or
transition between an old communist system of one-party monopoly to an unknown
pluralistic and democratic system requiring significant negotiation, compromise, and
127 Ibid.
128 Miller. "The Pitfalls of Econonllc Rdorm in YliCoslavia: 217.
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patience. l29 Given recent history we now know that the period of transition for a
political entity is its most dangerous period. And in this case, the worst case scenario
was quickly becoming a reality.
2.1.1.4 Demographic Foundations
Also important as a means of explaining the Croatian secession and the Yugoslav
dissolution is a brief examination of how demographics facilitated the secession and
violence from 1991 to 1995.
The composition of Yugoslavia and Croatia is very complex. The communities
are intertwined and intermarriage is common. The former Yugoslavia consisted of
Serbians (36.3%), Croats (19.7%), Muslims (8.9%), Slovenes (7.8%), Albanians
(7.7%), Macedonians (5.9%), Yugoslavs (5.4%), Montenegrins (2.5%), Hungarians
(1.9%), and those classified as "other" (3.9%).'30 Croatia's ethnic composition
included, prior to 1995, Croats (78%), Serbians (12%), and others (10%).'''
It is important to recognize that the demographic make-up of the former
Yugoslavia made it difficult to remain united. In this sense, the nature of all ethnicities
129 CobelI,~,328. CoheDdi$eu$5e'lheprobiemsoftn:lllfonn:mon.lheyn:laletolusccptibilitytopol.iticalillndC(X)n()mic
turmoil.
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in the country affected the viability of the state because the extreme diversity may have
eventually contributed to inter-ethnic discord, not just among Croats and Serbs, but also
between other ethnic groups. lJ2 This contributed to an atmosphere of chaos
disunity,m For example, the constant antagonism that existed between the Serbs and
Albanian Muslims in Kosovo may have created an air of disunity. The Serbian policy
in Kosovo from 1982 onward became provocative and cast a dark shadow over future
inter-ethnic cooperation.'" In fact, the Slovenes and Croats had been wary of Serbian
ntilitary action in the autonomous province because it signalled the reality of the use of
aggression as a means to stifle the articulation of national assertion. m
In terms of furthering inter-ethnic suspicion and intolerance, the existence of a
significant Serbian minority in the Krajina and Siavonia (Eastern Croatia) was
problematic from 1989 to 1995 because of the fear among Croatian Serbs of the
perceived re-emergence of Croatian fascism of the 19405.'36 These regions and their
demographic characteristics made it difficult for Croatia to secede peacefully.
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2.1.2 The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia
While systemic problems coupled with a declining economy and an increase in
nationalism contributed to the decline of the Yugoslav state, the failure of Czechoslovakia
in 1993 is based far more on the bilateral relationship and experiences of Czech and
Slovak political leaders than on the failure of institutions to accommodate regional
interests or the rise of secessionism or nationalism. This section attempts to outline the
major contributors to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state and the secession of the
Slovak republic.
2.1.2.1 Historical Foundations
One of the most nOlable features of Czech and Slovak history is the divergent
development of the two national groups'" Politically. economically. and culturally.
the Slovaks experienced modernization much more slowly than the Czechs and many
observers comend that this divergence may have been detrimental to future inter-ethnic
cooperation and unity. III The divergence in development is largely due to the fact that
for centuries the Czechs had been under Austrian rule and the Slovaks had been under
137 See Sanilla., 1. KindlbMIJa, Slo.,aDa; NMipg.!hI; C!"i!tt...... grCentn! E"'9F!Ii (New York.: Spdkr md SaM, 1960), IG-:U; and
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69-~.
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Magyar (Hungarian) domination. While the Czechs enjoyed significant autonomy and
embarked on industrial, political, and national development, the Slovaks were subjected
to the process of Magyarization as the assertion of their national identity was ruthlessly
denied. 'l9 Consequently, a sense of distinct Slovak nationhood developed more slowly
than its Czech counterpart. l 4()
The implications of this divergent historical development are arguably equivocal.
While it is difficult to discern what impact the suppression of the Slovak nation had on
future inter-ethnic relations, the thesis contends that the asymmetrical development
created two politically and economically contrasting nations, where from 1918 onward,
tensions arose from this divergence to directly place pressure on the sanctity of the
Czechoslovak union. 141
For example, it is arguable that the political environment in Slovakia (one based
on ties to religion and cultural traditions) did not mix well with the pluralistically and
democratically oriented Czech political environment. 142 However, it is difficult to
ascertain what impact this may have had on future relations but one may conclude that
\l9 Ibid.• 66.
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competing jX)litical traditions emerged which led to seemingly incompatible national
agendas and eventual paralysis during the post-communist era. 1o Rychlik concludes
his examination of the differing Czech and Slovak historical experiences with the
ub~rvalion lhal "the potential factors of Czechoslovakia's destruction were laid down in
the very basis of the common state. Nonetheless, it could not be said that their
activization in 1989 to 1992 was inevitable. I '"
Another argument that can be entertained as an extension of the historical
divergence hypothesis reslS on the issue of the economic development of Slovakia.
Because Slovakia had remained underdeveloped in comparison to the Czech lands, the
principal period of industrial development took place during the communist period. What
can be called over-industrialization or rapid industrialization crealed a Slovakia that was
overly dependent on heavy industry, particularly in the military sector. 1-4j With the
dawn of reform politics on the horizon after 1989, the economic reforms of the federal
governmenl adversely affected Slovak industry in an asymmetrical manner, thus funher
contributing lo inter-ethnic antagonism and eventual secession. l-46
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Historically based analysis is extremely important. The historical experiences of
the Slovaks and Czechs created two fundamentally different political, economic, and
cultural realities. This divergence, in the very least, may have created barriers to future
cooperation and unity. However. it is not the contention of the thesis that the
aforementioned divergence is solely responsible for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.
Institutional. economic. and demographic concerns must be addressed.
2.1.2.2 Institutional Foundations
The constitutional problems of post-eommunist Czechoslovakia had much to do
with the inheritance of the 1968 constitution.141 While the thesis does not fully
examine the exact characteristics of that constitution, this section outlines the main
problem with it and how it exacerbated the unity crisis after 1989.
The existence of three chambers, one federal and two republican. made the
likelihood of passing constitutional amendments very difficult. Under the provisions of
the 1968 constitution, a majority in each chamber was required to pass legislation. To
make the task more ominous. in the case of constitutional amendments, there was a three
fifths majority requirement in each chamber. In no uncertain terms. this constitullon was
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problematic under the condition of a pluralistic system of govemment. I.' During the
communist pericxl the Cooper.ltion between republics that is required to pass legislation
was guaranteed because the Communist parry monopolized its position in government.
When one considers the nature of post-communist politics with its conflictual pany
platforms and agendas. the IikelihO<K1 of passing important constitutional amendments
reflecting the future arrangement of the federation was negligible. I•9 In essence, the
constitutional process was a failure because of the existence of the parity principle. Lhe
requirement of a super-majority for constitutional amendments, and the prohibition of
majority rule. ISO
2.1.2.3 Economic Foundations
The communist period of existence ended in Czechoslovakia in 1989, allowing
Lhe Czech lands and Slovakia to embark on a period of democratic and economic reforms
in a multi-parry pluralistic society. While the federal institutions of communist
Czechoslovakia and post-communist Czechoslovakia were problematic in terms of
I.'~~ -e-:ao?S\oYltia;~~.'" C Mrm Mably. Eatcm ElI!'!!Dfcd. Dock Howvd
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constitutionaJ reform, the reasons for Czechoslovakia's dissolution are not entirely
politically based.
Jiri Musil describes several catalysts to the disintegration of the state and the
subsequent secessions. The key to the disintegration, according to Musil, are national
differences in conceptions and opinions regarding the division of powers between the
Czech and Slovak political institutions.'>! The perception of Slovaks is that the federal
institutions did not adequately address the concerns of the Slovak people with regard to
their political. economic, and social concerns. Musil goes on to say that the most
relevant reasons for the country's dissolution are based on differences in economic,
social, and cultural development, differences in value orientations, mutual
misperceptions, and different attitudes toward the common state of Czechoslovakia. 152
It is at this point that it is necessary to gain an understanding of Slovak society and the
absence of an acceptance of the Czechoslovak state.
Although Slovakia had been primarily agrarian and significantly behind the CLcch
lands in terms of political and economic development in the beginning of this century,
Slovakia, in fact, caught up to the Czech lands during the era of communist party rule
in virtually all respects. However, the differential political and economic development
created a difficulty in maintaining cohesion after 1989 under a pluralistic system of
government. Speaking from the perspective of modernization theory, this thesis argues
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that, as Jm Musil points out, the Slovak and Czech processes of modernization developed
"asynchronously" and not in relative unison. U) The development of the Czech lands
occurred significantly earlier and under a capitalist environment where as the Slovak
development occurred at a later stage and under a Soviet model of economic
development. The problem here is that the Soviet model emphasized a swift
induslfialization program because of the Warsaw Pact's desire to create militarily viable
satellite states in Eastern Europe.l$4 Slovakia had, to a significant extent, been an
agrarian state.
However, with the implementation of industrial plants capable of constructing
military hardware, Slovakia industrialized very quickly. This process also created
communities which were almost entirely dependent on large scale industrial
organizations. The effects of this swift industrialization included an agrarian sector that
had suffered major losses and the creation of an underdeveloped induslfial socitLY.
How did this differential development affect inter·elhnic relations in the post-
communist Czechoslovakia? Arguably. the reforms of the Czech dominated post-
communist federal government, which had focused on rapid economic reform, also
differentially affected the level of prosperity in Slovakia, increasing unemployment to a
greater extent than in the Czech lands"$$ In turn, the disparity in economic conditions
1s.4 Ibid.. 79. M\lSlldi$eutllC*the~ffe<:bordc:~lopmentonfvnan:inter-ethnicrd.......
1$$ Ibid•• 19.
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manifested itself in inter-ethnic turmoil at the legislative level, especially with regard to
the achievement of constitutional reforms satisfactory to both parties. lS6
After 1989, the Slovak population became less satisfied with the reforms of the
federal government as many Slovak citizens lost confidence in the government and its
ability to effectively represent the interests of the Slovak peopleu7 To the Slovak
people, Slovakia gained a significant degree of improvement under a communist system
of government and the implementation of reforms in the 1990s seemed only to worsen
the economic situation in Slovakia. Surprisingly, nationalistic sentiments were not
forthcoming and significant support for Slovak secession was not evident in the
populace. lSi Thus the continuation of the separatist movement was primarily supported
by Meciar and members of his party. Coupled with these parochial interests, political
elites and the general public were growing weary of what they deemed an "emotional"
attachment to nationalism and the fact the governing of the state and the implementation
of reform policies were becoming increasingly difficult. In lhe end. the absence of a
IXJlitical will 10 continue negotiations over a united Czechoslovakia was crucial to its
dissolution. 159
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1'.
Theoretically, what can one say about the impact of economic reforms on a state
in transformation? Clearly, economic reform has significant ramifications on states in
transition. Economic reforms further destabilize countries as they create unequal
conditions and asymmetrical effects. l60 In essence, if we are to use Slovakia as an
example, these asymmetrical effects contributed a readiness to accepts secession once
political elites made this goal their foremost priority. The economic reforms utilized in
Czechoslovakia were macroeconomic in nature and had differential effecLS on the Slovak:
Republic. leading to the desire among elites to initially obtain additional autonomy and
subsequently to gain independence. 161
2.1.2.4 Demographic Foundations
Although Czechoslovakia consisted of only two republics. a discussion of
demographics is necessary to outline how inter-ethnic relations in a bi-polar state may
have made unity difficult to maintain. It is commonly assumed that the Czechs and
Slovaks had lillIe in common throughout their long history together in a common state.
However, it is clear that while major differences in historical experiences and economic
development are notable in Czechoslovak history. the two ethnic groups have grown
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closer together in important respects. l62 Nevertheless, despite the fact that the two
groups were becoming increasingly similar in terms of political and economic
development. each national group maintained its identity. 16J The bi-polar relationship
between two primary national groups may have made inter-ethnic cooperation
increasingly difficult. The inclusion of a third republic. such as a potential RMoravian
Republic R• as discussed below, would have eased the bi-polar tension between the
Slovaks and C.lechs and may have eliminated the perception of a zero-sum game.
It is arguable that the very bi-polar nature of federal relations between the C,oxh
Republic and the Slovak Republic created a politically stressful environment or the
appearance of a zen}-sum game between two diametrically opposed ethnic groups where
one group gains and the other loses. ". Perhaps the inclusion of a third republic may
have undermined at least the perception of a zero-sum game and created an atmosphere
where a number of republics could break. the constitutional paralysis.
Another argument rests on the problem of Moravian requests for greater
autonomy in the Czech lands. The Moravians, a fairly significant ethnic minority in the
Czech Republic, grew increasingly interested in gaining more autonomy in the
Czechoslovak state during the period of negotiations from 1989 to 1993. The Czech
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leadership of Havel and Klaus felt that this may have stemmed from the uncertainty of
negotiations on the future of the federation and calls from Slovak leaders for a tri-partate
federation. l 6.'i The Czech Republic felt that this would merely undermine economic
reforms in the Czech lands. One can argue that this internal threat made it more crucial
for the Czech leadership to accept Slovak secession and establish a deadline for
dissolution.
Demographic realities, therefore, may have at least acted as catalysts to the
eventual dissolution of the state as they made it difficult to gain a consensus over a
renewed federation. The demographic realities of the Slovak and Czech republics are
important in the discussion of why the Czechoslovak dissolution was not violent. Only
I % of the Slovak population was Czech and only 4 % of the Czech population was
Slovak.'66 In addition, both the Slovaks and Czech minorities were concentrated
primarily in the capital cities of Prague and Bratislava respectively.'61 The relatively
low level of concentration in each republic and the location of the respective ethnic
groups made the likelihood of territorial demands and territorial acquisition very unlikely.
The absence of these demands made the use of force equally unlikely.
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2.1.2.5 Conclusion
The Czechoslovak: case provides an interesting example of a dissolution without
a strongly developed secessionist movement. In Yugoslavia, separatist movements were
in abundance and they sought to establish sovereign states with the support. especially
in Slovenia and Croatia. of el1mically identifiable citizens. The Czechoslovak dissolution
involved the timely congruence of structural failure, cognitive experiences involving
negaLive perceptions anu misperceptions. debilitating and differential economic effects,
and parochial and diametrically opposed political elite illlefe~lS in a newly dCllltxraLIt: and
pluralisLic environment where most citizens opted for a unified state . all of which
contributed to an environment of institutional paralysis. 16I In essence, the revisiting
of constitutional debate that is so often me reality in some western federations (i.e.
Canada) was perceived as an unwanted and unnecessary characteristic of the Czech and
Slovak: union. Despite the widespread support for the continuation of a common Slate.
politIcal luenlilicalion with political parties was very unstable in the Czech Republic and
even more unstable in the Slovak Republic.''' In fact, the elections of June 1992
indicated a participatory involvement of approximately 83 % in both republics, but many
citizens, when polled, changed their minds on issues and political pany affiliation. l70
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What are the implications of these realities? First. because the political affiliation was
weak:. the citizenry was easily influenced and mobilized by nationalist political elites who
sought to garner support for parochial causes. l1I Second, there are fewer limitations
placed on these political elites to follow public opinion. as this was clearly the reality in
the Slovak and Czech republics where ethnically identified politicians sought out
ethnically based political agendas. In
It is also important to note that in the Slovak case the dissolution of the
CzedlOslovak federation was not based on national self-determination or secession as it
had been in Croatia but on the simultaneous emergence of constitutional. economic. and
political crises during a period of transitional weakness. '" The success of the
secessionist movement in Slovakia can be attributed to the aforementioned unstable
political affiliation of the electorate along with the emerging dissatisfaction with economic
and political realities of the new Czechoslovakia. 17.
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2.2 THE RISE OF SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS: Secession, Ethnic Conflict, and
Self Determination
At this juncture it is necessary to examine the emergence of secessionist movements in
the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Caution should be used when discussing the
Czechoslovak case because one can argue that an authentic secessionist movement did
not exist in either the Czech or Slovak: republics. 115 Nevertheless, we can examine the
nature of the political movements that eventually pushed the country toward dissolution.
First, the thesis examines the emergence of secessionist politics in Croatia with a special
emphasis on the Serbian Repuhlic because it is necessary to acknowledge the problematic
relationship between the two largest ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia. Second,
we discuss parties and figures involved in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia with an
emphasis on the Czech and Slovak republics. And finally, a discussion of ethnic conflict
and nationalism is provided to demonstrate the relevance of these phenomena to the rise
of secessionist movements in Yugoslavia and the secession process in Czechoslovakia.
The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the eventual secession of the Croatian Republic
were due to a multiplicity of conditions within and outside Yugoslavia. These
conditions, combined together at the right moment, created the right atmosphere for the
dissolution of the state and the subsequent secessions. Along with the factors described
in the previous sections, the political elites and their secessionist goals were responsible
11' A~>(lllBt_il.poIiDcallylllObilizedor.-.... ~_obJectIvc... arDa&1II£dle"ftfof~alId..
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for the dissolution of Yugoslavia because of their respective parochial interests and
actions. 116
No other individual in the Yugoslav dissolution has had as great an impact as
Serbian President, Siobodan Milosevic. Milosevic's political agenda after 1987 began
with the implementation of a popular socialist program and the resurrection of
nationalistic themes related to the historically important autonomous province of Kosovo
and the existence of a significant Serbian minority in Eastern Croatia. In The 1987
election of Siobodan Milosevic in the Republic of Serbia began a period of Serbian
chauvinism and nationalistic resurgence. 17I
Milosevic's ability to "play the nationalistic card" in Serbian politics was
facilitated by a previously existing sense of Serbian national grievance which manifested
itself ever more clearly during the 1980s. An important landmark in this development
was a joint declaration by prominent Serbian intellectuals. This was issued in the form
of a Memorandum from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Belgrade between
1985 and 1986 which alleged that the federal government discriminated against the
Serbian people, that the partitioning of Serbia into three parts weakened the republic, and
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that minority Serbs in Kosovo, Vojvodina, and elsewhere were harassed. l79 This
memorandum was provocative in that it indicated that Serbia would now be intransigent
in its stance for a stronger Serbia in Yugoslavia and it contributed to the devastating
military action in Kosovo which was not overlooked by the Croatians and
Slovenians. 110 It was not until the years 1989 and 1990 that Milosevic's intentions
became clear. Milosevic, with the continued assistance of the potiticized JNA, began to
assen Serbian authority in the autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Both
provinces were stripped of their independent administrative capabilities and, in the case
of Kosovo, the majority Albanian Muslim population was harassed and intimidated by
Serbian police and the JNA.'" The common perception of the remaining republics'
leaders was clear: Milosevic would use force to achieve the objective of Serbian
hegemony in Yugoslavia or a Greater Serbia at the least.'" After the election of the
HDZ or Croatian Democratic Union led by the controversial Franjo Tudjman in the
Republic of Croatia in 1990, Milosevic turned his attention, rightly or wrongly, to the
welfare of the Serbian minority in the Krajina. 1I3 The nationalist inclinations of the
Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, quickly became apparent and in the eyes of many
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Serbian observers in the region, the existence of fear among Krdjina Serbs was
legitimate. 11Il
The collapse of the LCY in January 1990 led to the indirect control of the JNA
by Milosevic in Serbia. II~ Considering that the officer class in the JNA was primarily
Serbian, the JNA, on behalf of the Milosevic government in Belgrade, engaged in
intimidating acts and periods of interference in Croatia and Slovenia. For example, the
JNA immediately following the election of Franjo Tudjman disarmed the territorial
defence forces in Croatia,,16 As it was mentioned earlier in the thesis, the JNA acted
on behalf of Milosevic who attempted to stifle the attempts of the federal government to
embark on political and econontic reforms.'" Kadijevic, the leader of the JNA after
1989, sought to assist Milosevic in his attempt to consolidate Serbian control over several
regions outside Serbia and implement Milosevic's agenda for a more centralized
Yugoslav union despite the movement toward a more decentralized, confederal model
that was articulated by both Croatia and Slovenia.'''
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As was noted in the brief narrative of Croatia's secession in the introduction to
this work, Krajina Serbs revolted against the Croatian Republic. Milosevic first incited
this development and then utilized the JNA to assist the Krajina Serbs of the Krajina to
formally create the Serbian Autonomous Region of the Krajina or SARK. Again, the
action of the Serbian president was seen, especially by Croatians, as the realization of
his "Greater Serbia" agenda. l89 Subsequent Serbian military action in Bosnia-
Hercegovina was also seen as part of his plan to extend the borders of Serbia proper,
thus the leadership of Croatia and Slovenia as well as their citizens did not put mucb trust
into negotiations for a renewed Yugoslavia.
While Mitosevic's role in Yugoslavia's break-up was criticized, other leaders must
share the responsibility of contributing to the Yugoslav crisis and the eventual dissolution
of the state. Milan Kucan of Slovenia argued constitutional issues of a maner of right
with the federal government even when the government was headed by a reform-minded
Markovic from Croatia.I" This assertion of republican authority included ignoring tax
requirements and the economic reforms of the Markovic government. This behaviour
only made the reform effons by the fedeml government that much more futile and made
the plausibility of the dissolution of the state much more rea1istic. 191
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Still more important in relation to the subject of this thesis are the initiatives taken
by Franjo Tudjman, who disregarded Markovic's federal reforms and sought to
intimidate the Serbs of the Krajina.''' After the election of the HDZ (Croatian
Democratic Union) in 1990, Tudjman introduced a new Croatian constitution. The
Croatian constitution redefined the essence of Croatia's sovereignty by stating that its
sovereignty resided with the Croatian people which was in contrast to its earlier
constitution which emphasized the existence of the Serbian people in partnership with the
Croatian people. '93 This move by Tudjman was provocative in nature because it
created fear among the minority Serbs of the Krajina, who recalled the massacre of Serbs
during World War II.''' Tudjman also did very little to calm the Croatian people and
to curb the growing violence against non-Croats in ethnically mixed regions of Dalmatia
where after 1989, firebombings, beating, and the loss of employment by Serbs were
becoming commonplace.I" The political environment created by these political elites
was nOl one conducive to trust, cooperation, or compromise. The direct influence and
interference by Croatian, Siovenian, and Serbian officials in federal policy objectives
compromised the intention of Markovic's government to search for an alternative model
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of government for all of Yugoslavia's republics. 1M One could speculate that the
republican leaders' motivations rested with the desire to ensure independence and to
acquire territory.
Crucial in the problematic negotiation process and ensuing conflict in the former
Yugoslavia is the emergence and role of President Franjo Tudjman. Like Milosevic,
Tudjman played a major role in the conflict. Tudjman was a highly placed apparatchik
in the Croatian Communist Party until he began to openly articulate the sentiments of
many common Croatian citizens on the issue of the Croatian national assertion of ethnic
identity and republican autonomy.l97 Despite Tudjman's metamoll'hosis into a
"democrat" and his creation of the HDZ or Croatian Democratic Union in 1990, he was
not truly committed to the effective implementation of democratic principles. l98
Tudjrnan is responsible for political platforms based on the discrimination against
minority Serbs within Croatia prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the desire to acquire
and alter additional territory outside of Croatia proper, and the articulated policy of not
recognizing Bosnian Muslims as an ethnicity entitled to a nation-state of their own. l99
Tudjman is also guilty of the practice of intimidating Croatian independent media
whenever such sources question the policies and record of the president, with the paper
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"Slobodna Dalmacija" being subjected to police harassment and oven political
scrutiny.200
2.2.1 The Role of Political Parties in the Secession of Slovakia
Imponant in an analysis of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the Slovak secession
is an understanding of the political party differences and their role in bringing about the
end of a common state in 1993. While the Czechoslovak dissolution did not involve the
explicit rise of secessionist movements, the main political parties in Slovakia and the
Czech lands contributed to the secession of Slovakia. Unlike the Yugoslav experience,
the dissolution of Czechoslovakia involved no mass movement of separatists, no use of
armed forces, no secessionist drives, and virtually no overall public suppon for the
dissolution of post-communist state.ZOI Thus while structural concerns and perceptions
playa role in the dissolution of the post-communist state, the diametrical situation
between the Czechs and Slovaks as illustrated in the motives and aspirations of their
respective political parties play an even more imponant role in this case.
The 1990 election of the Civic Forum in the Czech lands and the Public Against
Violence in the Slovak Republic marked the beginning of the end of inter-ethnic
cooperation. In 1989, the two parties worked together to bring about the mutually
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agreeable dissolution of the communist monopoly in the country.202 However, with the
communists gone and the task complete, the relationship between the two republics
needed to be dealt with in terms of constitutional amendments.203 Nevertheless, the
political panies, with the exception of the communists, were almost entirely
representative in their constituent units in each republic with no broad ranging, cross-
ethnic appeal. This fact helped to make Czechoslovak statehood problematic.
The diametrically opposed party systems were accompanied hy the equally
contrasting views of two new and dominant parties after the 1992 elections.204 The
success of "national" parties was a result of the poor performance in elections between
1989 and 1992 of cross-ethnic parties with the Communist Party enjoying the only cross-
ethnic support.2Ql Vaelav Klaus, leader of the Czech party called the ·CDp· or
Christian Democratic Party, was intent on pursuing the continuation of economic reform
as well as gaining membership in the European Union."" This program for action
required that the Czechoslovak: state become more centralized with some Czech
politicians arguing for a unitary state.2O? In contrast, the Movement for a Democratic
,.,,,,,.
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Slovakia headed by Vladimir Meciar sought to increase the autonomy of the Slovak
Republic, primarily focusing on the negative impact of economic reforms on the republic
and the perception that the Czechs, through numerical superiority, dominated policy in
the federal assembly at the expense of the social welfare of the Slovak people.""
The absence of a "federal" party with support in both Slovakia and the Czech
lands shifted the emphasis onto the "national" parties, thus contributing in the long run
to the emergence of intransigent republican positions on the crisis of the federation and
the dissolution of the state. 209 The 1992 elections witnessed the re-emergence of
republican parties in the Czech lands which were opposed to a confederal model and in
Slovakia which were fundamentally against the continuation of a stalus quo
federation. 2lo Klaus' Civic Democratic Party and its coalition partners as well as
Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia set in motion the collapse of the
federation.211
Most crucial in the ensuing secession of Slovakia was the 1992 parliamentary
elections and the fe-emergence of two parties, the Civic Democratic Union and the
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, whose party platforms were diametrically
2OI 1lrid,,1J6.1J1.
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opposed.m This development was largely due to the reality of divergent party systems
in each republic. 213 In rum, this stemmed from separate opposition movements which
had been established prior to the coUapse of the communist government in 1989 in what
has been coined the "Velvet Revolution" .21" Coupled with an electorate which
preferred "national" or ethnically based parties and the absence of any federal party,
aside from the communists, with any significant cross-cultural support, the emergence
of party policies based on intransigent systems of belief on the future of Czechoslovakia
ensued.IIS Again, there is a relationship between the existence and prevalence of state-
wide party systems and political parties and the stability of the state. The absence of a
state-wide system of political parties is likely to increase the probability of political
instability and secession.216
2.2.2 Ethnic Conflict, Nationalism, and the Rise of Secessionist Movements
It is clear that nationalism in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, as articulated by
secessionist movements in the former and intransigent political elites in the latter,
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contributed to the disintegration of th,ese states. Any anempts to transform their
respective societies to market oriented. democratic entities proved problematic as each
national group became increasingly confrontational. In the case of Yugoslavia, the
Croatian Republic was riding a wave of nationalistic fervour. This re-emergence of
nationalism was fuelled by an ineffective federal system of government and by the
parochial interests of internal and external political elites. In general, the re-emergence
of nationalism in Eastern Europe can be attributed to the collapse of the communist
monopoly of power and re-pluralization of the respective societies. In Czechoslovakia,
nationalism was not popularly accepted by the Czechoslovak people. Slovak political
elites established and developed their own political agenda on the sovereignty of the
Slovak Republic. These elites, without popular support for secession, sought to use the
secessionist card to strengthen Slovakia's position in the federation?11 Nevertheless,
one must examine what nationalism and secession are and how they may have interacted
in both case scenarios.
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2.2.2.1 The Conceptualization of Nationalism
Carlton Hayes in what is considered a classic work on the subject described
nationalism as the fusion of patriotism with a consciousness of nationality?Js A
nationality. according to his view. is a group of people who speak a common language,
are tied to a community, a set of historical experiences, and have a conscious awareness
of themselves. E.J. Hobsbawm adds to Hayes' depiction of nationalism. According to
Hobsbawm, nationalism is a rather vague phenomenon, and is often exclusionary, hostile,
and lacking in objectives, while at the same time acting as a bond of common cultural
characteristics. 219 Thus nationalism is characterized as an affinity to a single group,
not necessarily ethnically identifiable, coupled with knowledge of that group's existence
in contrast to other groups.
The aforementioned definitions provide an understanding of some key
characteristics associated with nationalism. These characteristics, while not necessarily
detrimental to multi-national, federal, or unitary systems, clearly can pose difficulties for
these systems under certain conditions. Of particular importance are the characteristics
of nationalistic movements. Such characteristics determine whether the movement will
likely be detrimental to the existence of a particular state. Nationalism, particularly in
211 CarUorl Haya. N@!!!alism" "Belin!!! (New York: Tbc M.-:MillaD Company. 1960),2.
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Eastern Europe, is not tied to the liberal idea of pluralism but to ethnicity.220
Nationalism, for this reason, is important to this study because it can directly affect
conflict and possibly secession.
2.2.2.2 Nationalism and Ethnic Connict
One of the most notable features of nationalism in Croatia is its extreme nature
as well as the manner in which political elites utilized the emotional attachment to the
nation of Croatia after 1989221 The nationalism of Croatia after 1989 culminated in
policies oriented toward the consolidation of the Croatian people as sole inhabitants of
Croatian land. This was articulated in constitutional changes in 1990 whereby President
Tudjman simply erased any mention of Serbian rights in the constitution as equal
panners.222 In this sense, nationalism found its way into the construction of the
Croatian constitution which, in tum, caused problems between republics as the
amendments were seemingly threatening toward a particular ethnic group.
Nationalism also found its way into neighbouring Serbia. A discussion of the
effects of Serbian nationalism is necessary due to the problematic relationShip between
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Croatia and Serbia. Once again, nationalist sentiments were fuelled by the election of
Slobodan Milosevic in 1987. To reiterate an earlier premise, Milosevic utilized the
emotional attachment to nationalism in Serbia by focusing on the plight of the Serbs
during World War II and the threat posed by non-Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo,
and Croatia. This articulation of nationalistic sentiment contributed to the fragile
relations near the end of Yugoslavia's existence.223
[n Slovakia, the attachment to nationalism by ethnic Slovaks was seen as
emotional in orientation. Membership to the Slovak nation seemed more important than
the support of the Czechoslovak federation, thus the interests of the Slovak people were
parochial in nature'" While Slovak nationalism became intolerant during WWlI,
nationalism during the post-communist era was not extreme. However, the attachment
to the Slovak nation did contribute to the dissolution of the state as it ignited the passions
of the ruling elite despite the fact that only a minority of Slovaks supported secession.
2.2.2.3 Nationalism in Eastern Europe
Another aspect of nationalism relates to the question of secession as it is affected
by divergent concepts of nationalism. In this context, the international community and
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the common perception of nationalism is often portrayed without an acknowledgement
of how nationalism and secession are seen in Eastern Europe. To be precise, in Eastern
Europe, the concept of nationalism is utilized in the understanding of sovereignty and
self-determination. The common view rests on the assumption that self-determination,
sovereignty, and secession are an extension of ethnicity and nationalism and this
expression entitles a particular ethnic group to ownership of a state.22S Consequently,
national or ethnic identity is utilized in the larger objective of gaining statehood which
is contrary to the western emphasis on popular sovereignty.226 The Eastern European
version of nationalism and secession ultimately complicates inter-ethnic relations as it
contributes to the desire of a "collective" to pursue secession and state recognition. With
the absence of homogenous nation state entities in Yugoslavia, the likelihood of violent
conflict is significant. In summation, this view of nationalism contributes to the
possibility of secession.
2.2.2.4 Constitutional Nationalism
To revisit the nature of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, one must
distinguish the nationalism of Yugoslavia to the nationalism that is found in other nation-
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states. One can depict the nationalism of Croatia. for example, as ·constitutional
nationalism·. The impact of this type of nationalism on secession is significant and
merits discussion here.
As a new state in a democratizing Eastern Europe. Croatia needed to demonstrate
to the international community that it was commined to democratic ideals and minority
rights in order to gamer support for independence and to be recognized by members of
the international community. The problem that emerged in Croatia and the other
Yugoslav republics for its political parties was the dual requirement of gaining political
support among the electorate while at the same time appearing to be sensitive to
democratic principles. 227 The concept of constitutional nationalism was utilized to
achieve these dual objectives and it is characteristic of all of the former Yugoslav
republics. In addition. it is clear that the concept and its adoption. especially in Croatia
and Serbia, contributed to the alienation of minorities and the eventual use of
violence. 221 To be precise, the Croatian government in 1990 utilized constitutional
nationalism to create the legal basis for the discrimination against national minorities and
to strengthen the position of the national majority.
Another characteristic of constitutional nationalism as characterized in Croatia is
its emphasis, obviously, on the collective ethnically described group rather than 00 the
western principle of the individual. As SUCh. the constitution set out in its preamble to
227 Roben M. Ha}'de1l, ·Constitutioftal NltionaliIm ill die Fonnerl1 Y\IIOfllov RtpubOcl,·~ (WinlU 199'2): 6$5.
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relegate the national minority of the Serbs and to strengthen the ethnically Croat
population by emphasizing the ethnic basis of the Croat nation (Hrvatski narod) rather
than giving it a political basis. To rectify any negative impact that this racist principle
would create in the international community, the text of the constitution included
provisions for the protection of minority rights. However. the preamble allowed the
Croatian government to exclude the Serbs and their demands for recognition, as Tudjrnan
promoted the use of the formerly fascist coat of arms, the exclusive use of the Latin
script and Croat language in the country, and the removal of Serbs from many
bureaucratic posts. 229 Similarly, it is also arguable that Slovakia's leadership in the
period since it gained its independence has adopted constitutional nationalism, but with
less than dire consequences.
In essence, the preamble only reinforces the concept of constitutional nationalism
regardless of the protections listed in the text.no This reliance on constitutional
nationalism is an important part of the analysis of the Croat secession movement as it
contributed to the alienation of the Serbs in Croatia by creating a state of fear and
mistrust. Therefore, one can conclude that the constitutional nationalism of Croatia acted
as a catalyst for the uprising of the Krajina Serbs and subsequent violence.
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2.2.2.5 Nationalism's Triadic Relationship
What is also imponant in the study of nationalism is the manner in which national
minorities, nationalizing states, and external homelands interact with one another to
facilitate secessionist movements. National minorities refers to minority ethnic groups
within a state occupied by an ethnically defined majority. For example, the Krajina
Serbs of Easter Croatia (prior to 1996) can be considered a national minority.
Nationalizing states are those which have recently become independent through secession
or are on the verge of seceding from a larger entity and which utilize nationalistic
policies focused on ethnicity to unite the citizenry and isolate any opponents. The newly
independent Croatia can be considered a nationalizing state. Finally. an external
homeland is an ethnically defined stale which mayor may not share a border with
another state which, in tum, is comprised of an ethnic minority that is in some way
connected to the external homeland. In the case of Yugoslavia and Croatia. it is often
assumed that the minority question in Croatia had to do with the relations between
Croatia and Serbia proper. The relationship, however, is triadic and exists between
Croatia, the Krajina Serbs, and Serbia proper or the homeland of the Krajina Serbs'J1
The existence of three parties complicated the relationship and served to create
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intransigent positions in Croatia between the Croat majority and the Serbian
minority .232 Also, the triadic nature of the dispute created multiple secessionist
movements with completely incompatible agendas. However, given the Czechoslovakia's
demographic make-up, there was no basis for a triadic relationship because the number
of Czechs in Slovakia was and continues to be minimal, with no territorial aspirations
being apparent.
2.2.2.6 Self-Determination
The main problem of self-determination is that a state or group of states must
recognize that right under international law. The most important political entities in this
regard include the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations.'"
Because the concept is always in flux with the changing characteristics of the
international community, the legalities of the right to self-determination and the
recognition of that right are not fixed eternalIy. The problems for ethnic contlict are,
thus, founded in the basis of recognition of the right to self-determination.
First, the international community was slow to react to the ensuing crises in
countries such as Yugoslavia.234 Instead of agreeing on new principles of recognition
232 lbid.
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of the right to self-determination, the United States and the European Union continued
to utilize dated principles of recognition. Specifically, this involved the continued usage
of the principle of the inviolability of borders'" The implications of the usage of the
principle in the Yugoslav case were significant. The fact that the existing boundaries in
Yugoslavia did not in anyway reflect the ethnic composition of the republics posed
problems immediately, The borders should have been modified in some circumstances,
especially in relation to the Serbian dominated Krajina and Eastern Siavonia, It is true.
however. that the redrawing of the territorial boundaries may have been impossible
because of the intermixing of ethnic groups.
Second. the recognition of the right and the principles that were utilized in the
recognition were not uniform and were inconsistent.2J6 On the question of the principle
of protecting minority rights, the United States and different European Union members,
did not apply the protection of minority rights principle equally.'" The clear violation
of minority rights in Croatia in relation to the treatment of Serbs did not seem to weigh
heavily on the minds of the Germans in their recognition of Croatian independence.231
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The inconsistent application of the ntinority right requirement may have contributed to
the premature recognition of Croatia.2J9
Finally, no enforcement principles have been developed which would allow those
states who recognize self-determination to reprimand the receiving states in the event of
a violation.1<" Newly independent states, such as Croatia, could possibly assert that
they intend to recognize the principle of protecting ntinority rights. In fact, the Croatian
case is interesting in that while it asserted its comntitment to the protection of ntinority
rights in the main text of its constitution, the preamble to the constitution indicated that
the Croatian state was primarily for ethnic Croats.241 However, enforcement seems to
be a very unlikely venture and it is difficult to envision any mechanism which would
allow one to enforce the requisite principles when newly independent states violate
ntinority rights.
2.2.3 Response of Central Governments: Attempts to Prevent Secession
Because the Croat and Slovak secessions involve federal governments, it is necessary to
deterntine what role if any the central governments in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
played in the maintenance of unity.
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220.
In the Yugoslav case, several federal government initiatives were launched to
further the cause to retain the Yugoslav federation. As it has been mentioned earlier, the
Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic launched a series of economic and political
reforms designed to stabilize the Yugoslav economy by making the Yugoslav dinar
internationally convertible, getting inflation under control, and promoting
privatization.'" While Markovic enjoyed the luxury of being one of the most popular
Yugoslav politicians regardless of ethnicity, his reforms were despised by republican
leaders, especially in Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia.243 Even more problematic was the
assumption by Markovic that economic reforms and the benefits of such reforms would
stifle the emerging flames of nationalism and the imminent disintegration of the Yugoslav
federation.". The emphasis on economic reforms reflected a misunderstanding of the
emerging crisis. That is that re-emerging nationalisms of Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia
were the result of an institutional crisis and collapse. There was no effective institutional
mechanism that would enable the republican leaders to reach agreement on a renewed
federal arrangement. However. it is arguable that with the election of nationalistic
political parties in each of the aforementioned republics there was no intention or desire
of any them to reach any agreement.'" The reality of the Yugoslavia of the early
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19905 was that its republics elected parties on strictly nationalistic platforms. These
elections occurred before any pan-Yugoslav union elections could take place.
More problematic. however I was the absence of any effective central
governmental authority in Yugoslavia prior to the war. By March 16, 1991, the Federal
Presidency was no longer functioning and the respective republican representatives
blocked the election of Stipe Mesic as Yugoslav President.''' Thus Yugoslavia existed
as a state prior to its dissolution with no functioning federal assembly, federal
presidency, or federal party. This left a vacuum wit1tin which the parties gained
additiooal power. Furthermore, the absence of any governmental authority left room for
the JNA and its head Kadijevic to propose the usage of armed force to maintain
Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. These precipitating events are discussed in the next
section.
In Czechoslovakia during the 1991 and 1992, the atmosphere at the federal level
of government was much different than what was evident in Yugoslavia. The federal
government, the federal presidency, and the federal assembly were all functioning under
a pluralistic mode of government. However, while this reflected a desire to embrace
democratic political ideals, the response of the federal government to the emerging
Slovak momentum towards secession was not entirely adequate. In essence, the federal
presidency and federal government sought to pursue economic reforms at the expense of
2-46 Ibid., 139.
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dealing effectively with the concerns of the Slovak Republic.''' The primary concerns
of Slovak citizens rested on the asymmetrical effects of the economic reforms on the
Slovak Republic and the subsequent rise in the level of unemployment in that republic.
The Czech leader, Vaclav Klaus, was determined to pursue rapid economic reforms at
virtually any cost. In doing so, the federal government placed less priority on the
preservation of the state than on the goal of economic reform.
The worsening relations between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as
well as the eventual dissolution of the common state can be attributed to several factors
regarding the manner in which the federal government responded to the crisis. Much has
been said about the dominance of the Czechs in federal politics. The general feeling
among Slovaks was that the welfare of the Slovak people was not high on the list of
importance in the state capital Prague, giving way to economic considerations which
highlighted Czech arrogance, and in the case of President Vaclav Havel's handling of the
crisis, Czech neglect.'" And by the time Havel demonstrated the political resolve to
place the Slovak question on the political agenda, the crisis reached a point of no return,
with each republic becoming more intransigent in their positions.'" The continued
position of the Czecb leadership, including Klaus, was that the state would exist as a
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federation and nothing else."" The loose confederal model preferred by the Slovak
leader Medar was Dot considered seriously by Klaus and there was no desire to
accommodate the Slovaks in this regard.'" Realizing that a referendum would not
yield the results that Klaus desired, the Czech leadership opposed any such democratic
mechanism arguing that the nature of such a referendum would not rectify any of the
difficulties related to federation.'"
10 summation, the federal entities in both federations were clearly incapable of
achieving the maintenance of the state. In Yugoslavia, the inability rested with rapid
devolution of power to the republics, the incapacity and collapse of the federal presidency
and LCY, and the emergence of the INA as the arbiter of Yugoslav unity. In
Czechoslovakia, the federal government was incapacitated by an ineffectual and
dysfunctional constitution and the desire of federal officials to place economic reforms
ahead political unity in importance. In both circumstances, the reasons for secession rest
primarily with domestic or internal factors. There is a relationship between the structure
of the respective federations and the stability or longevity of the states involved.
External factors, especially in relation to the Soviet Union and the decline of communism
in other Eastern European states, also facilitated the further weakening of both the
Czechoslovak and Yugoslav federations.
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2.3 DIRECT PRECIPITANTS OF SECESSION: Confrontational Developments
Most of the emphasis of the thesis is placed on the preconditions of secession in
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. At this juncture. we briefly discuss the events that
precipitated the secession and created the perception that there was no other option but
to pursue secession. Because of the violence associated with the Croatian secession, the
precipitants to its secession are far more readily identifiable. The reader may also
discover some overlap when reading this section as the infonnation provided here is also
pertinent in other sections.
2.3.1 Precipitating Events and the Croatian Secession
Precipitating events refer to a period of time just prior to the break-out of violent conflict
in Yugoslavia in 1990 and 1991. Several events eventually acted as catalysts in the
secession of Croatia. First, the collapse of the LCY, the federal presidency. and the
federal assembly in 1990 and 1991 left a power vacuum at the federal level. This
resulted in a further devolution of power to the republics and the appearance of chaos at
the federal leveL'" The ramifications of this collapse is that it allowed the JNA and
General Kadijevic to pursue an interventionist option aimed at seizing territorial defence
253 Silber, The [)g!JIofYuplavil 139.
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garrisons in the republics.2.Sc4 This move was seen as being very provocative and as a
direct challenge to the declarations of sovereignty in the republics of Croatia and
Slovenia.
Second, as it has been mentioned earlier, the Croatian constitutional emphasis on
Croatian ethnicity and its denial of a recognition of a Serbian minority further
exacerbated the situation during 1990.'" The subsequent removal, beatings, and
flrings of Serbian civilians and police officers also acted as a catalyst to the emergence
of intransigent positions in Serbia proper.'" From this inter-ethnic conflict within
Croatia emerged an additional problem: an unwillingness of the JNA and Serbia proper
to recognize the right of Croatia to exercise its right to self-determination.
Third, one must examine bow events in the international community may have
acted as a precipitating event in the Yugoslav crisis. The creation of the Yugoslav
federation by AVNOY (The Anti-Fascist Peoples Army of Yugoslavia) in 1945 was
based on the desire to unite the peoples of the Balkans into a single nation against the
dangers of external control.'" However, the existence of the Yugoslav state not only
depended on a delicate balance of internal political, social, and economic interests, it also
depended on a balance with the conditions of the outside world. In other words, the
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domestic order and survival of Yugoslavia hinged on its place in the international
system.2.SI
Yugoslavia's legitimacy internally was based on its ability to defend the republics
from the ominous Soviet-bloc and the west. The Soviet threat had been utilized on
numerous occasions by then President Josip Broz Tito to enhance the credibility of the
communist party and the continued existence of the south slav entity. Membership with
the non-aligned movement and with the underdeveloped world also enhanced its position
internally.259
However, the year 1989 saw the very rapid collapse of communism in much of
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union released its grip on the Warsaw Pact, exposing the
remaining countries and their respective reform movements. With the Warsaw Pact gone
and with the rest of Eastern Europe embarking on political and economic reform, the
Yugoslav state became less legitimate and useful. Its existence depended on a delicate
balance of internal and external forces.uo And coupled with a deteriorating internal
environment, the absence of a foreign threat created the right environment for
dissolution.261
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Fourth, one must also consider what impact elections may have had on the
secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia. Specifically, the sequence of elections may act
as precipitators to secession and even violence. Most problematic in the secession of
Croatia and the dissolution of Yugoslavia is the fact that both were in a period of flux
or transition. As such, the legitimacy of the state was in question. By 1990,
Yugoslavia's legitimacy was in question, especially in Croatia as the country was very
weak and in transition. With the transition period already commencing, the emergence
of a pluralistic society was in motion. Multi-party elections were being sparked in
Croatia and Slovenia ftrst, followed by the remaining republics. The key here is the
nature of the elections. The characteristic of the transition period when the Yugoslav
state was losing legitimacy included the formation of several ethnically based political
parties.
Furthermore, pluralization of federal politics was behind that of the republics.
The argument posed here is that the precedence of republican political elections and the
tardiness of federal or all-union elections contributed to the rise of secessionist
movements and acted as catalysts to the dissolution of the state.'" That is the sequence
of elections further hindered the legitimacy of the federal government. It is possible that
had all-union elections occurred prior to republican elections the eventual collapse of the
state may have been at the very least postponed. Coupled with this reality, the absence
of a sincere commitment to democratization and the difficulty in creating cross-cultural
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political entities allnwed republican elites to exploit regional grievances and subsequently
undermined any commitment to Yugoslavia as a whole.261
The transition period also put another stress on the viability of Yugoslavia. The
collapse of the commurtist system and the only cross-cultural party created what can be
called a vacuum in the political system. The existence of a well-established civic society
comprised of a middle class and educated elites was lacking, contributing to the rise of
nationalistic parties in Croatia and the culmination of constitutional nationalism which
further undermined the Yugoslav state and gave fuel to republican elites' nationalistic
drives.264
2.3.2 Precipitating Events and the Slovak Secession
The Czechoslovak situation did not involve precipitating events of litis nature. The
primary events to consider are associated with the nature of the party formations in each
republic. Essentially, the existence of two diametrically opposed political parties in the
Czech and Slovak republics precipitated the eventual secession of Slovakia.'" As
mentioned earlier, the desires and aspirations of the Slovak and Czech parties (Meciar
and Klaus) reflected divergent economic and political realities in each republic. The
26J 1Irid•
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desire for increased republican autonomy by Meciar and lbe desire for greater
centralization and a continuation of rapid economic reforms by Klaus were mutually
incompatible. Czech citizens and elites were becoming aware lbat lbe continuation of
lbe union was hindering lbe opportunity for success in lbe Czech lands.
Most importantly, lbe recalcitrant position of Vladimir Meciar and his party lbe
Movement For a Democratic Slovakia set lbe stage for lbe collapse of lbe state.'"
Coupled wilb Meciar, Vaclav Klaus and his Civic Democratic Union party sought to
move further to the right and continue the economic reform program.261 However,
prior to 1992, Klaus and Meciar made several attempts to reconcile lbeir differences and
set forth to reach a compromise. With the continuation of the conflict, Klaus made a
conscious decision to avoid any compromise wilb lbe Slovaks on lbe basis that further
negotiations would harm lbe progress of Czech economic reforms.'" In essence, bolb
republican leaders made lbe decision to deliberately avoid any further alteration in lbeir
respective positions on a renewed federation. At this juncture, lbe nature of lbe
secession crisis reached its peak. Even Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel seemed
to give way to lbe emerging belief lbat no compromise could be reached to maintain lbe
federation.'" To add to lbe key political figures and lbeir hardening of positions, one
266 S.iala..J.~,'~ nc.~.~._~ol.N.-.sc...·90-93.
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must also look at the decision to set a deadline for a resolution. By virtue of establishing
this deadline, they left little room for compromise or additional negotiations which may
have surpassed this deadline period."" Arguably, the establishment of a deadline may
have precluded further heated debate and possibly even violence.27I Paradoxically, the
deadline acted as a precipitating event in that it set in motion the process of dissolution
and secessioD.
210 YOIItII,D.....S!.. 22-31.
271 Ibid.
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3.0 EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DIVERGENCE IN SECESSIONIST METHODS
A poll conducted in the fonner Yugoslavia during 1990 by the polling organization Dela
indicated that 52% of the Croatian population was in favour of confederation, 28 % was
in favour of total secession, while 8% was in favour of a continuation of the status
quo.m Polls conducted in Slovakia during 1992 indicated that only 16% was in favour
of a fonnal separation while most Slovaks were receptive to a confederal arrangement
with the Czech landsm With such a perceived commitment to continued relations,
why was the secession so utterly violeot in Croatia? Why was the dissolution of
Czechoslovakia so peaceful? It is clear that the momentum of institutional disintegration
and the role of political elites influenced the outcome of secession. But, this important
subject should be looked at more closely.
Lenard Cohen offers some general observations on the basis for violence in the
Croatian secession and the Yugoslav collapse. According to Cohen, the animosities
between ethnic groups were extremely persistent and well established, there was a desire
of Yugoslav citizens to act upon retaliation against atrocities committed during WWlI,
and the nationality policy of the communist federal government failed to resolve long
standing inter-ethnic problems and develop a basis for inter-ethnic tolerance'"
m MilieaA. BookmaD, ·WlZaDdPul:e: ~Oi~BrukvplofY\llOfIavi&IftdCZlCc:bof.Io¥Wa,·19urpa!0fPuq!!!dRcKtrd!31
(19904): 176.
rn Ibid., In.
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Yet, the violence could have been avoided. Based on the realities in the conflict,
the use of violence became "inevitable" only when certain conditions were not met and
certain "problems" witb tbe secession were not adequately answered. Specifically, the
fact that the secession of Croatia and Slovenia were constructed in haste and in a
unilateral manner contributed to the likelihood that the use of violence was probable'"
There are several factors that directly contributed to the likelihood that the
secession would be violent. First, the existence of a large number of Croatian Serbs in
the eastern frontier region of tbe Krajina made the secession a challenge at best. At the
time of the secession, nearly 11.6% of the Croatian population was Serbian in origin and
a large number of these Serbs inhabited the Krajina. Tbe constitutional amendment by
Croatia which relegated the Croatian Serbs to the status of a protected minority and the
subsequent uprising of the Krajina Serbs to create the SARI( (The Serbian Centre for
Arts and Culture) created an atmosphere of mistrust and fear'" The result is a
collective feeling tbat one's ethnic group is in danger of serious harm or death. The
Croatian government viewed the Serb uprising as an extension of a Serbian plot to divide
Croatia and establish a Greater Serbia while the Serb minority viewed the Croatian
leadership's actions as an indication of intolerance or a reflection of past historical
treatment.m In any event, the actions of both parties made the likelihood
276 Milivojevic, "TbeArmed Forl:Q o(Y\lIOIIavia," 67.
m For Subian and CroMim polilieal clU ptrt'CjlCloa$ on e¥enl$ in 1990, _tan Kcama, -CroIl1iao PoIirXa: The New AutboriWiaIIillD,"
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of violence probable, placing the emphasis on pre-emptive measures rather than on
negotiations.m Second, the reason for violence can be found in the role of political
elites and the role of the INA in Croatia and the subsequent events leading to its
secession. The politicization of the JNA by Milosevic created a tense environment in
Croatia where lNA forces were seemingly acting as a buffer between the Krajina Serbs
and the Croatian paramilitary. The lNA, due to its disarming of the territorial forces and
its pro-Serbian stance, was seen as an occupational force in Croatia.279 Once again,
the mobilization of forces on both sides reflected an unwillingness to engage in a
constitutional divorce. Political elites lacked a common trust in the process of discourse
and the actions of both the Croatiarts and Serbiarts reflected a desire to utilize pre-
emptive measures. The conflict between Croatia and Yugoslavia, including the INA and
the Krajina Serbs, began in 1991 and continued sporadically until 1995.'" With the
August 1995 capture of the Krajina by the Croatian Republic, the use of violence was
once again witnessed. The territory divided Croatia nearly in half and precluded much
personal and commercial transport. The Krajina problem extends back to the settlement
of Serbs near the Krtin area as military personnel used to fight the Ottomarts. Their
continued presence was not resolved until 1995 when nearly all Serbs in the region had
been removed through force. The remaining region of Eastern Siavonia is also
m a..:,-ne~"')'IUlOtr)'olW•.• I67.
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problematic yet recent moves towards the nonnalization of relations with Yugoslavia may
yield results through non-violent means.
The absence of violence in Slovakia was due primarily to the patient, negotiated
process of a legalistic separation. However, the absence of serious territorial issues and
any significant mutual minority problems between the Slovaks and Czechs led to a
peaceful and negotiated settlement.
What can one say about violent conflicts and secessions in general? A conflict
of interest is not necessarily sufficient for the emergence of violence. Slovakia and the
Czech lands clearly had a conflict of interest but did not resort to the use of violence to
resolve that conflict. To explain the existence of violence, one can assume that there is
the desire to exert a pre..,mptive strike against an opponent. This pre..,mptive strike is
utilized because of a perception of a threat. While conflict is often perceived as being
a foregone conclusion in this case, ODe must consider what events increased the
likelihood of violent conflict and how those events may have compounded upon a
previously peaceful series of disagreements to create a heightened level of conflict and
the emergence of violent conflict'" In the case of Croatia, the use of the INA to
interfere in the Croatian independence movement, the Croatian commitment to a racist
pursuit of constitutional nationalism, and the uprising of the Serbs in the Krajina (SARK)
all acted as pre-emptive measures, feeding off one another and tipping the conflict from
21llllllsdHardia.9nEfwN!·TbelAljcO(GrpypCO!lt!ks~: Prillodr:lDl)ll!'f'enil;yPftll,I995).'42·t19. Kardladileussc:lttre
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one that was peaceful to one that became violent.282 Stability is shattered in this
instance and dialogue is no longer seen as a legitimate means of resolving the conflict.
More can be said about the absence of violence in the Czechoslovak case. Robert
Young's case study of Czechoslovakia's break-up offers a very concise and succinct
assessment of why the Slovak secession was peaceful.283 Young also published an
article that provides a general comparative analysis of historical examples of peaceful
secession in "How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?" in the Canadian Journal of Political
Scienke}84 This assessment may be applied to other cases.m
Several common elements in conjunction with one another may increase the
likelihood of a peaceful secession. One should refrain, however, from assuming that
these elements are causal in nature or that they are sufficient for a peaceful secession.
First, a peaceful secession often involves protracted negotiations. 286 Initially, the
Czechs and Slovaks were involved in constitutional negotiations which spanned a period
of two years and which included several attempts by all parties to resolve their
282 Ibid .• 143.
283 YO\llII, The Brukup of CmehOllgvalj!. 18.
284 Robert A. YO\lIII, "How Do Peaceful Seoeasions Happen'" C!DMlian Joum!l or Political Scirnq xxvn (Dceember 1994): n3-792.
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inC(lmplde. Lijpllutide'ltificd atbooretil;al interpretive, bypodle.lis-tenermr.l. thcory-wofirminl, !heory-infirminJllldlkviantCl5e'tudies. Younl, I
CIIIMlian scholar C(Inocme<! over the pos,ible brulr.-up of the ClnMlian SbU. eatJ&e(l in a eue-,tudy 111&1)'1 • .nth the purpoee of drawinl Ie$SOIlS from
enmplel of pealXfvl seoeniollS whicb mir,bl be Ippliclble to the Canadian case. Lijp/lut's article which IppUl'lld first in the American PolitiqJ Scirnq
~ is ~printe4 in Comparative Politiq_NO!g I!!d Reading" See A. Lijpbart. "Compantive Politialllld the ComparMive Medlod," in~
Pong: Note! and Reading eels. Roy C. MlCI'idis Illd Beman! E. BlOwn (Homewood, Illinois: The Doney Press). 62-66 for III overview of <:ase-study
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differences on the future of the federation. In contrast, the Yugoslav experience indicates
an absence of protracted negotiations and an almost immediate use of force to strengthen
respective positions.217
Second. in a peaceful secession, the successor state declares its intentions for the
future.'" Initially, the Slnvaks were clear in their desire fnr increased autonomy and
later in their anempts to draw up provisions for an independent Slovakia."" In the
latter stages of negntiations, the Cucbs were arguably as commined to secession as the
Slovaks. Czecb leader Vaclav Klaus apparently became intent on pushing Vladimir
Meciar of Slovakia to go for the independence option."" In Yugoslavia, each side
declared their intentions eventually but this seemed to have the opposite effect. Instead,
the positions of the main antagonists were bardened and acceptance of republican
positions on the future of Yugoslavia was not forthcoming.'"
Third, the predecessor state accepts the principle of secession and negotiations tn
complete that secession follow."" While this acceptance was not immediate in the
217 Ff'Ollltbebq;ilul"ofl990,Deloa.iDalrvr'~"'Yll(Otl.tvia~DOtdnwllOUl,perllaptbecazeor~mpti"'_waby
lefI6et'I, ill 00Itia, SknoeDia, mdSubia..tUcfJ. woukI eaa-Ibeit reapeclivc potiliouill dleevealof • .- c:on.c-.
219 Ibid•• 15.
290 Ac:alrdiqmll.obuty_,.C1Iut_~ri!albcimpKtllllollCnailllywoukllul'I'Cc.dlcr.wreoltbec.dl~. The
~~Y;Ckkdl:ialc.leI'al$OfIDew~tbUl~IppAnIdIO~dlcSlonkkadulOciecidc_dlef'\lll&RS\oorUiL
291 BTWIb. M.,., The Dgtnp;tiqg pf Y''9'M (1.oIodoIl: Veno, 1993), 10. MIl- {II'OVidcI • d.itcllniolt of die PlIO- of die pmtim 10
llle coMlicl: ill Yuplavill in 1990.
98
Czech lands, the protracted negotiations and the ecooomic and political instahility that
resulted in the Czech lands may have led the Czech leadership to accept the reality of a
Slovak secession.293 The secessionist intentions of the Croats and Slovenes were not
accepted in Serbia even though its republic was still suffering from the economic
stagnation of the previous years of hyperinflation.'" The politics of the day may have
precluded the Milosevic government from such an acceptance. Although his motivations
are questionable they will not be discussed here.
Fourth, governmental negotiators and the parties involved are strengthened on
each side and there is an emphasis on solidarity. Of any of Young's contentions, this
one is the weakest. First of all, solidarity was weak in the early part of negotiations
because the nature of the political arena in the country was fluid.'" Political solidarity
would later be realized just prior to the eventual dissolution of the state. Second,
solidarity seemed apparent in the Yugoslav republics because the Croatian and Serbian
governments did not permit the articulation of any groups which differed in opinion on
the political crisis whether those groups were Croatian or Serbian.'" It is arguable,
however, that the existence of so many different parties in the Yugoslav conflict, may
29l ltrid.
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have only contributed to the emergence of violence. The next element of a peaceful
secession points to this contention.
Fifth, a peaceful secession involves few participants in the negotiation
process.'" The benefit of such conditions is that the meetings are concentrated
between only two parties and not several different parties with competing interests. The
talks that occurred between the Slovaks and Czechs were between the leaders of the
Christian Democrats in the Czech lands and the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia.'" As such, the level of concentration was high and the parties quickly
agreed on a timetable to either resolve the differences of the republics in the form of a
new constitution or amendment or to dissolve the state.299 The Yugoslav crisis, on the
other hand, involved Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, and eventually Bosnia-Hercegovina, each
with divergent interests and objectives which probably made agreement on anything
nearly impossible given that three of the antagonists were already committed to use
force. JOO
Sixth, another key to a peaceful secession is the attainment of a rapid settlement
after the initial negotiations. lO! Once again, the parties to the Czechoslovak crisis were
m Y-e. The BtW¥p qf Ca!d!o-SIoYJkia .cl.
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very reluctant to drag out the proceedings because of the negative effects of uncertainty
on each republic, especially in the Czech lands.
Seventh, the mark of a peaceful secession of course involves the use of
constitutional measures to bring about the end of the secession.102 There was mutual
agreement in the Czechoslovak case that a constitutional answer was necessary to resolve
their differences and neither the republics nor the federal presidency wanted to act
unconstitutionally. )0)
Again, while these elements are not causal and are not sufficient for a peaceful
secession, they systematically identify the main elements that guided the Czechs and
Slovaks to a peaceful separation. Not all of Robert Young's elements are as applicable,
yet his conditions provide a starting point to identify the most salient aspects of the
Slovak secession. The absence of certain elements in the Yugoslav case also reveals
points where it is discernable that violence would become probable.
To conclude, the Slovak situation lacked most if not all of the qualities described
in the Croatian case. The Slovaks and Czechs were pre-occupied with the necessity of
formulating a procedure for secession - both sides recognized the need for this and they
recognized the probability that the secessions would occur. Neither side had significant
mutual minority problems, except perhaps for the Slovaks who have a significant
Hungarian minority where some level of animosity exists. However, neither side has any
lO2 rbid .,S2.
)0) Ibid.,n
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interests in protecting the minorities in the other republic. Also, neither republic allowed
the conflict to reach the level whereby pre-emptive measures would be utilized. In
essence, while the Czechoslovak society was in transition and its institutions were weak,
the constitution was functioning and discourse was commonplace. Moreover. it bas been
shown that the commitment to secession was not forthcoming in either republic on a mass
scale. The mobilization of hatred-bound nationalities in the former Yugoslavia more or
less precluded a peaceful secession.
3.1 Conclusion
We have utilized the framework by John Wood to provide a systematic explanation for
the secessionist events in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. However, one should be
cautious before assuming that this framework is sacrosanct. The framework fails to take
into account the importance of the demonstration effects of developments in one state
upon those in another. The collapse of communist power in East Europe and the
disintegration of the Yugoslav, Czechoslovak, and Soviet states was a remarkable process
involving interrelated developments. It is arguable, for example, that the events in the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary influenced events in the former Yugoslavia.
Likewise, it is arguable that the horrifying violence in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina
affected decision-makers in Czechoslovakia who were pondering secession and
102
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dissolution. Their preoccupation with avoiding anarchy and a chaotic divorce arguably
stemmed from what they had witnessed in the former Yugoslavia.
Similarly, Robert Young's framework is not entirely applicable to the case
studies. The framework does not discuss the issue of momentum or external events in
relation to possihle effects on the existence of violent or non-violent secession. It fails
to take into account circumstances such as demographics, pre-emptive measures by
groups, or various forms of nationalism. Because of these weaknesses, the thesis has
sought to incorporate other issues into this chapter in order to provide a balanced
approach to explaining the secession process and the existence or absence of violence.
One must also examine the secessionist events which occurred throughout the
world previous to the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak crises. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the ensuing secession of the Baltic states set the stage for the aforementioned
crises. As Jacques Rupnik points out, the Baltic secessions "delegitimized the federal
state. "304 The communist and previously communist multi-ethnic states of Eastern
Europe recognized the problematic nature of these federations and the Baltic secessions
acted as a catalyst for similar political movements in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.
With such momentum, the secessionist platform was seized by national groups in the
transition federations of Eastern Europe.
304 J.cquca Rllpllik, one l,uel'llflllonal CoalUt,' III The EDd or Cucbodovlkia cd. lirt M\Ilii (1.oadoo: Cc.ntnI Europeaa Prtu, 1995).
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The dissolution of the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak federations and the subsequent
secessions of the Croatian and Slovakian republics were fundamentally divergent in terms
of the foundations for collapse and the existence or absence of violence. The study here
cautions against assuming that the failures of the two states were inevitable. In fact, their
failures reflect the value of studying the structural and processual aspects of federalism
as they interacted with the phenomenon of nationalism. Institutional and structural
objects were critical but contingency and the role of individuals were singularly important
in both cases.
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